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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment today is the creature of Justice Samuel Miller's 
opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases. 1 In his opinion, Justice Miller 
argued that the Clause did not create any new privilege or immunity for 
citizens of the United States; it merely referred to existing privileges or 
immunities. The success of his views led the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to become a sterile tautology. 2 
Without the Clause, states would still be barred from abridging the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States3 and Congress 
could still legislate to protect those privileges or immunities.4 Thus, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates 
like the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which do not create the "rights ... 
* Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I 
would like to thank Justin Brenner, Alice Johnson, Lena Kim, and Nicolas Blendy for 
their research assistance, the faculty workshop at the University of Maryland School of 
Law, my coiieague Gordon Young, and especially Drake University School of Law, its 
Constitutional Law Center, and the Drake Law Review. 
1. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
2. A number of authors have attempted to find room in Miller's opinion to 
support the use of the Clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states. See 
generally Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A 
Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 647-48 (2000); 
Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, 
Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 769 (1984); 
Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in 
Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1063-67 (2000). Others have suggested that the 
Clause, under Miller's reading, expands congressional power either to define privileges 
or to override sovereign immunity. See James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and 
Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement 
Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 164-65 (2002) (privileges); William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges 
or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 153, 230-32 (2002) (sovereign immunity). I have explained at length elsewhere 
why these scholars have misread Miller's opinion or why their theories for expansion 
are unlikely to be accepted. See DavidS. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the 
Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 390-96 (2003). 
3. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868) (holding, prior to 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, that a tax on travel out of state could 
not be collected because it violated rights of citizens of the United States). 
4. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842) (holding 
Congress could enforce the Fugitive Slave Act in order to make effective the Fugitive 
Slave Clause of the Constitution, although there was no express constitutional grant of 
power to Congress to enforce the Clause). 
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retained by the people'' 5 or the "powers . . . reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people,"6 but simply acknowledge their existence. 
The Supreme Court is unlikely to alter Justice Miller's interpretation 
of the Clause because overturning it would serve little purpose. By 
interpreting the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses broadly to 
attack racial discrimination,? to enforce guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
against the States,8 and to apply fundamental rights limitations,9 the Court 
5. U.S. CoNST. amend. IX. Daniel Farber argues impressively that the 
Framers assumed that government had no legitimate authority to violate basic human 
rights regardless of constitutional provisions, and the Ninth Amendment recognized 
that. See DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DoN'T KNOW THEY 
HAVE 6-9, 40-44 (2007). That does not detract from the literal reading, which is that 
the Ninth Amendment recognizes rights-it does not create them. Thus, the strongest 
judicial support for the Ninth Amendment was Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, in which he asserted that the Ninth Amendment is not an independent 
source of rights but "simply lends strong support to the view that the 'liberty' protected 
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal 
Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first 
eight amendments." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965). 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
7. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (applying equal 
protection to forbid segregation in schools); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (16 
Otto) 303, 310 (1879) (holding racial discrimination in jury pool violates the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
8. The Court has not yet applied the Second, Third, or Seventh 
Amendments against the states, nor has it required states to use grand jury indictments 
as required under the Fifth Amendment for many federal crimes. The guarantees of 
the rest of the first eight amendments have been applied to the states. See Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (Sixth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 
(1964) (Fifth Amendment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (Eighth 
Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Fourth Amendment), overruled 
on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (requiring state court exclusion 
of evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures); Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (First Amendment). Justice Black identified 
incorporation in the whole of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather 
than in the Due Process or Privileges or Immunities Clauses alone. Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne of the chief objects 
that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were 
intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states." In 
Duncan v. Louisiana, Justice Black used the Privileges or Immunities Clause to refute 
the argument that incorporation was not textually plain: "I suggest that any reading of 
'privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States' which excludes the Bill of 
Rights' safeguards renders the words of this section of the Fourteenth Amendment 
meaningless." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
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has achieved the results that an expansive reading of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause would reach. Although Justice Thomas has urged a 
return to historical roots, 10 and some scholars have called for a new 
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 11 there is little 
incentive for the Court to reverse a well-established precedent when doing 
so would not affect outcomes.1z 
However, he also relied on the Due Process Clause in his concurrence, arguing that 
"The due process of law standard for a trial is one in accordance with the Bill of Rights 
and laws passed pursuant to constitutional power, guaranteeing to all alike a trial under 
the general law of the land." /d. at 170. 
9. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding criminalization 
of homosexual conduct violates due process because adults have fundamental right to 
autonomy in intimate choices); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding a 
fundamental right of privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
10. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
11. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1316-31 
(3d ed. 2000) (discussing the obstacles facing courts and lawyers in dismantling the 
encumbrances of Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases); Richard L. Aynes, 
Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 628 (1994) ("Justice Miller's 
majority opinion was indeed based on an incorrect reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . . [T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to protect substantive rights, primarily the Bill of Rights, 
from state abridgement."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1146-47 (1992) 
(arguing that the overly broad ruling of the Slaughter-House opinion has unfairly 
prevented later courts from protecting rights under the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: 
The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 
1146-49 (2000) (interpreting and broadening the meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to include the protections in the federal Bill of Rights based upon 
the common understanding of the words of the Clause at the time it was proposed and 
ratified); Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and 
Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REv. 1, 86-90 (1996) (arguing that banning 
private actions undertaken with the specific intent of depriving a citizen of 
constitutional rights would be within the power of Congress). 
12. Proposals like those of Professors Curtis and Zietlow would change 
current law by empowering Congress to legislate to protect rights against infringement 
by individuals. See Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 11 and accompanying text; 
REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 60--62 (2006) (arguing that the 
Reconstruction Amendments name "Congress, not the courts, as the principal 
enforcers of those rights"). These proposals will not be embraced by the current Court 
because all of the clauses of the second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
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Scholars and the Court should give up the fruitless pursuit of a change 
in the meaning of the Clause, and instead shift to developing the substance 
of the privileges or immunities that Miller identified or implied in his 
opinion. Building on Miller's opinion is a largely neglected task-in the 
past fifty years the Clause has been used only in cases establishing the right 
of interstate travel. 13 Outside of the discussions of this right, little in the 
literature builds on Miller's premises. 
This Article focuses on one aspect of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States envisioned by Justice Miller's opinion in 
Slaughter-House-their international dimension. These privileges and 
immunities include: the ability to engage in international trade and 
commerce; the protection of person and property abroad; the rights 
secured to individual citizens by treaties of the United States; and the 
privileges and immunities available under customary international law to 
the extent that the federal government behaves consistently with such 
rights. 14 
This Article describes these privileges or immunities of citizens and 
suggests that the international perspective of privileges or immunities may 
be helpful in considering future directions. For example, if government is 
instituted to establish and protect its citizens internationally, states cannot 
extend boycotts to citizens dealing with disfavored foreign governments 
unless Congress approves. Second, citizens' international travel is limited 
only by deference to executive and legislative discretion in foreign 
relations. Third, treaty provisions establishing individual rights should be 
presumed to be self-executing. Further, states may not establish a foreign 
policy in breach of customary international law in the absence of federal 
indications of support. 
structured as limitations on state behavior, and a "new federalism" Court will not 
change its stripes. If the Court's ideology were to shift radically, and a newly composed 
Court were anxious to get past the state action hurdle, it could use enforcement of the 
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses to do so without changing existing privileges 
or immunities interpretations. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of 
Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 
557-66 (1991) (arguing that a constitutional right to affirmative state protection exists 
through enforcement of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). 
13. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502-03 (holding that citizens are not to be 
discriminated against because they recently moved to a state to become residents). 
14. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,79 (1872). 
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II. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE AND JUSTICE MILLER 
The Slaughter-House Cases presented the Court with its first 
opportunity to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause after its 
adoption. Although the Fourteenth Amendment had been adopted to deal 
with racial discrimination, these cases raised an issue of the 
constitutionality of a slaughterhouse monopoly-and it was scarcely 
surprising that the Court found that the new Amendment did not forbid 
the state from regulating slaughterhouses in this way. 15 Former Supreme 
Court Justice John Campbell, on behalf of the Crescent City Butchers' 
Association, argued that monopolies abridged the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States, but Justice Samuel Miller's majority 
opinion held that the Clause did not apply to the issue. 16 
A. Privileges or Immunities as a Tautology 
Justice Miller distinguished the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of a state from those of citizens of the United States. The privileges and 
immunities of citizens of a state, Miller said, "embraces nearly every civil 
right for the establishment and protection of which organized government 
is instituted. They are ... those rights which are fundamental." 17 States 
are the source of criminal, property, and contract law; thus, citizens look to 
state government for the protection of their person and property. Miller 
insisted that "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as 
above defined, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the 
States, and without that of the Federal government." 18 His conclusion that 
reference to the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States 
Fourteenth Amendment did not involve the fundamental rights that were 
part of state citizenship disposed of the Slaughter-House plaintiffs' 
contention. 
Justice Miller went on to explain what the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States might be: "[W]e venture to suggest some 
15. See RONALD M. LABBE & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE 
CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 207-11 
(2003) (explaining the serious public health problems posed by the majority of the 
slaughterhouses' locations in well-populated areas upstream from the city's water 
supply, and the welcome reform crafted from legislative activity and capitalism that 
eventually relocated and centralized these facilities). 
16. /d. at183, 185-86,215-16. 
17. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76. 
18. /d. at 77. Those privileges and immunities are constitutionally protected 
by Article IV, Section 2, but only against discrimination based on state citizenship. 
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which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National 
character, its Constitution, or its laws." 19 The national character of the 
federal government, the provisions of the Constitution, and the laws 
enacted by the federal government are not created by the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause; hence, the Clause did not create privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States. It simply maintains the status 
quo with respect to their substance. 20 
B. The Significance of United States Citizenship for Miller's Clause 
The privileges or immunities of a citizen of a government flow from 
the function that government serves-they are the rights for which 
government was instituted. Citizens of a state and of the United States are 
both entitled to "'protection by the government, with the right to acquire 
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness 
and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may 
prescribe for the general good of the whole."' 21 The difference is the 
sphere in which these protections operate. The citizen of a state must look 
to the political process in the state to achieve the positive rights of 
protection of life, liberty, and property. The privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States refer to a government that regulates interstate 
and international issues and enforces the negative commands of the 
Constitution that restrict the states. 22 Miller's reference to the national 
character of the government suggests that the rights the federal 
government was instituted to establish and protect are primarily interstate 
and international. 
Citizenship of the United States confers implied rights as well as those 
stated expressly. For example, the Constitution does not expressly secure 
the right to travel from one state to another, but it is implied in the 
structure of the national government and the history of its creation. Thus, 
19. ld. at 79. 
20. Of course, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment established that 
persons not previously recognized by the Court were citizens entitled to such 
privileges-namely African-Americans excluded from citizenship by Justice Taney's 
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); see U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
21. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76 (quoting Corfield v. 
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)). 
22. Justice Miller's listing of the privileges ends with, "To these may be added 
the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the 
other clause of the fourteenth [due process and equal protection], next to be 
considered." Id. at 80. 
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before the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, the Supreme Court held in 
Crandall v. Nevada, in an opinion by Justice Miller, that a Nevada tax on 
traveling out of state violated the Constitution.23 In the Slaughter-House 
Cases, Justice Miller pointed to his Crandall decision as an example of the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. 
[T]he right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied 
guarantees of its Constitution, "to come to the seat of government to 
assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any 
business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, 
to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access 
to its seaports, through which all operations of foreign commerce are 
conducted, to the subtreasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in 
the several States."24 
Only citizens of the United States have this right to travel from state 
to state because it is derived from their relationship to the federal 
government.25 They also have a right secured by Article IV, Section 2 to 
be treated without discrimination in the state to which they travel.26 
Finally, citizens of the United States have a right to become a citizen of a 
state by moving there and a right to the same privileges or immunities as 
citizens of that state when they doY With respect to this last right, the 
Court said in Saenz v. Roe that "it has always been common ground" that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
23. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868). The most prominent 
use of structural implication was McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819); see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13-15 (1969). 
24. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79 (quoting Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 
at 44). 
25. See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) 
("For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one 
people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States, and as 
members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every 
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States."). 
26. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); see Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. at 77 (stating that the sole purpose of the Clause is to assure that 
privileges or immunities granted by a state to its own citizens are the measure for rights 
of citizens of other states within the granting state's jurisdiction); see also Paul v. 
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (asserting "the right of free ingress into other 
States, and egress from them"). 
27. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999). 
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protects this component of the right to travel. 28 
Therefore, the right to travel is largely an implied right, but it cannot 
be abridged, even by Congress. 29 The Privileges or lmmunities Clause 
creates no new protection for the citizen, but it identifies privileges or 
immunities as existing rights and underlines their protected nature. The 
critical question is what these rights might be. The Court has discussed the 
right to travel as a privilege or immunity of citizenship. 30 It has yet to 
express its analysis of foreign relations in these terms, although Justice 
Miller's description of privileges or immunities is heavily weighted with a 
discussion of foreign relations. 31 
Ill. PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP WITH 
RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The protection of the fundamental rights of citizens with respect to 
foreign nations was one of the reasons for the formation of the national 
government. 32 Justice Miller's list of privileges of United States citizens 
either expressly or implicitly referred to three areas of international 
relations: access to international commerce, travel and protection of person 
and property in foreign countries, and treaty rights. The method of 
analysis he used suggests a fourth area-customary international law. 
Privileges or immunities may be direct restrictions on government, 
but most privileges or immunities with respect to international law are 
derived from empowering the federal government to act. The power to act 
suggests a moral obligation to exercise the power on behalf of the people; 
however, there may also be implications involving default rules when the 
28. !d. at 503. 
29. !d. at 507-08. 
30. See generally id. 
31. See generally The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
32. For example, Alexander Hamilton stated: 
The principal purposes to be answered by union, are these: The common 
defence of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against 
internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other 
nations, and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, 
political and commercial, with foreign countries. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992). 
Although the Constitution was not drafted as a document of individual rights, each of 
these purposes has its analogue as a fundamental right of a citizen-to protection from 
foreign nations, to participation in commerce, and to rights under international law. 
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government fails to exercise that power. 
A. Access to International Commerce 
"He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the 
operations of foreign trade and commerce are conducted. "33 
"A regulation which imposes onerous, perhaps impossible, conditions 
on those engaged in active commerce with foreign nations, must of 
necessity be national in its character."34 
Justice Miller reasoned in Crandall v. Nevada that citizens of the 
United States have a right to travel from state to state in order to access 
operations of the federal government in another state; however, he also 
rooted the right to travel in a right to access foreign commerce: "He has a 
right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of 
foreign trade and commerce are conducted .... " 35 
Permitting foreign companies to purchase goods and services benefits 
the United States citizen who sells them, while permitting a foreign 
company to sell goods benefits the United States citizen who purchases 
them. Even though the right to access foreign commerce may be raised by 
citizens and non"citizens alike, participation in foreign commerce is still a 
privilege or immunity derived from the federal Constitution. In that sense, 
such participation fits Justice Miller's definition of privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States that a state could not interfere with. 
The ability of the United States citizen to sell abroad is supported by 
Article I, Section 9, Clause 5, which states, "No Tax or Duty shall be laid 
on Articles exported from any State."36 Other constitutional provisions 
expressly limit state power to burden foreign commerce-for example, "No 
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties 
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for 
33. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 35, 44 (1867). 
34. Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 259,273 (1875). 
35. Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 44. 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 5; see, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 
843, 861-62 (1996) (invalidating a tax on insurance premiums paid by foreign insurers 
to insure exported goods, saying that the Export Clause forbids imposition of a federal 
tax on export transit even though the tax is generally applicable and 
nondiscriminatory). 
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executing its inspection Laws;"37 and "No State shall, without the Consent 
of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage .... "38 These express limits on 
import and export duties show the importance that the Framers attached to 
the ability of United States citizens to buy and sell internationally, but 
there is no express prohibition on state regulation of foreign commerce. 
The privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States to access foreign 
commerce without state interference results primarily from the 
centralization of power in the national government to deal with foreign 
commerce. 
1. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
tribes." 39 The Commerce Clause grants Congress plenary power to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the power to prohibit 
it. 40 The Framers were concerned that regulation by individual states could 
produce a welter of conflicting rules that would impede trade and 
potentially enable coastal states to gain additional advantages over inland 
states in the arena of international commerce, even to the point of 
preventing inland states from having access to international trade. 41 Thus, 
the grants to Congress were designed to protect inland states and their 
citizens specifically, as well as to foster trade generally. 
The Court flirted with the idea that the grant of power to regulate 
interstate and foreign commerce was exclusive and that states lacked this 
power. 42 But the Court ultimately determined that some state regulations 
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; see, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 
U.S. 276, 302 (1976) (upholding a Georgia property tax on inventory maintained in a 
distribution warehouse on the grounds that a nondiscriminatory tax also imposed on 
imported goods no longer in transport was not an import tax under the Clause). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see, e.g., Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex 
ref. State Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261, 266-77 (1935) (upholding "harbor fees" as 
service charge for policing harbor and not a duty of tonnage because the fees were a 
levy on the privilege of access by vessels or goods to the port and distinct from service 
charges). 
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). 
41. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional 
Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 448-49 (1941) 
(discussing the offensive and defensive use of tariffs by the states to influence 
commerce). 
42. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209-10 (discussing whether a competing state law 
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were permissible and others were not. 43 When the Court perceives that a 
state regulation affecting interstate or foreign commerce interferes with the 
purposes of the grant of power to Congress, it will hold the regulation 
unconstitutional even though there is no relevant congressional action. 44 
This doctrine is known as the "dormant Commerce Clause," and it may be 
termed the "dormant foreign Commerce Clause" as applied to foreign 
commerce. 45 In Henderson v. Mayor of New York, Justice Miller used an 
early form of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause doctrine to strike 
down a state law that required posting a bond for arriving immigrants: 
A regulation which imposes onerous, perhaps impossible, conditions 
on those engaged in active commerce with foreign nations, must of 
necessity be national in its character .... It is apparent, therefore, that, 
if there be a class of laws which may be valid when passed by the States 
until the same ground is occupied by a treaty or an act of Congress, 
this statute is not of that class. 46 
States may regulate foreign commerce under current doctrine; only 
discriminatory or unduly burdensome regulation is forbidden. General 
state laws applicable to everyone will usually be upheld against challenges 
by persons who engage in foreign commerce. 47 The generality of the law 
"must yield to the law of Congress"). 
43. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1851) (holding 
that regulation of pilots was reserved to the states, but refusing to analyze commerce 
powers beyond the question of that specific regulation). 
44. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978) 
(holding a New Jersey statute that prohibited the importation of waste from outside 
the territorial limit of the state discriminated in violation of the Commerce Clause); 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145--46 (1970) (holding an Arizona law 
prohibiting a company from transporting uncrated cantaloupes from an Arizona ranch 
where it lacked packing facilities to a nearby California city for packing and shipping 
was an excessive burden on commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause); H.P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 544--45 (1949) (holding a state may not 
burden interstate commerce in order to promote its own economic interests); Cooley, 
53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318-320 (finding state power to regulate interstate or foreign 
commerce depends on the nature of the regulation). 
45. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 310 n.9 
(1994) ("Our jurisprudence refers to the self-executing aspect of the Commerce Clause 
as the 'dormant' or 'negative' Commerce Clause."); see also id. at 320 (discussing the 
"[dormant] Foreign Commerce Clause"). 
46. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 259,273 (1876). 
47. See, e.g., Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 40 (1948) 
(upholding state civil rights statute as applied to travel between Detroit and a 
Canadian island only after examining the factual circumstances carefully to determine 
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suggests that the state has a local concern rather than an antipathy to other 
states or nations; thus, such laws are unlikely to give offense. Further, 
citizens suffer no disadvantage from the law because they trade 
internationally. Discrimination, however, whether by regulation or by 
taxation, will be struck down. 48 
Many of the Court's decisions apply the dormant Commerce Clause 
without distinguishing between interstate and foreign commerce,49 
including the seminal case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens. 50 As Justice 
Stone stated in his DiSanto v. Pennsylvania dissent, "[T]he purpose of the 
commerce clause was not to preclude all state regulation of commerce 
crossing state lines, but to prevent discrimination and the erection of 
barriers or obstacles to the free flow of commerce, interstate or foreign." 51 
State laws that discriminate against both interstate and foreign commerce 
are struck down as to both. Despite suggestions that the Court should 
abolish the dormant foreign Commerce Clause, the doctrine is well 
entrenched. 52 The judiciary has a great deal of experience in applying the 
that the law did not impose an undue burden on doing business in foreign commerce). 
48. See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 
71, 82 (1992) (holding differential treatment of foreign and domestic subsidiaries by an 
Iowa law tracking the federal tax law violated the dormant Commerce Clause even 
though the discrimination was wholly against foreign commerce and did not favor Iowa 
subsidiaries). 
49. See DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 36--37 (1927) (holding that state 
law requiring a person who sells steamship tickets for foreign travel to be licensed 
violates the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause), overruled in part by California v. 
Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 114--16 (1941) (state law requiring a transportation agent to 
obtain a license for interstate transportation also applied to motor vehicle 
transportation over state highways, as it is a local concern that does not violate 
Commerce Clause). Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone dissented in DiSanto on the 
grounds that the law was a local concern and the Court's use of a direct and indirect 
effects test was inappropriate, but the dissenters also viewed the cases on interstate 
commerce and foreign commerce alike. !d. at 37-45. 
50. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). "Indeed the 
Cooley criterion has been applied so frequently in cases concerning only commerce 
among the several states that it is often forgotten that that historic decision dealt 
indiscriminately with such commerce and foreign commerce." Bob-Lo Excursion, 333 
U.S. at 38. 
51. DiSanto, 273 U.S. at 43-44 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
52. See Leanne M. Wilson, Note, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause After Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 746, 786--89 (2007) (arguing 
that the national unity principle underlying dormant Commerce Clause concerns 
interstate and not international matters, and that only Congress should determine 
whether state law affects international affairs so severely that it should be barred). 
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dormant Commerce Clause to foreign trade, and Congress has given no 
indication that it should stop. By not forcing the executive or Congress to 
become involved every time a state law affects interstate or foreign 
commerce, the doctrine benefits citizens of the United States who want to 
engage in international trade. 
The Court has indicated, however, that the dormant foreign 
Commerce Clause may be even more restrictive than the dormant 
interstate Commerce Clause: "When construing Congress' power to 
'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,' a more extensive constitutional 
inquiry is required."53 In addition to the factors used to determine whether 
state or local taxation interferes with interstate commerce, the Supreme 
Court said: 
[A] court must also inquire, first, whether the tax, notwithstanding 
apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple 
taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal 
Government from "speaking with one voice when regulating 
commercial relations with foreign governments." If a state tax 
contravenes either of these precepts, it is unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause. 54 
Subsequent cases continue to refer to the difference in standards, but 
they have consistently upheld state taxes against dormant foreign 
Commerce Clause challenges if the tax would pass muster under dormant 
interstate Commerce Clause analysis. 55 The Court retreated on the risk of 
international multiple taxation and seems satisfied in most cases by a 
state's attempt at fair apportionment, lest concern for multiple taxation 
override legitimate state taxing power.56 Thus, the Court upheld a state 
53. Japan Lines, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979). 
54. !d. at 451. 
55. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 330-31 
(1994) (upholding a California franchise tax on a multinational corporation domiciled 
in foreign country); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 193-97 
(1983) (upholding a California franchise tax on a multinational corporation domiciled 
in the United States). 
56. The Court in Container Corp. distinguished Japan Lines on the grounds 
that it involved an ad valorem property tax on containers used for foreign commerce 
rather than a franchise tax based on income. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185-86. It 
noted that Japan treated the containers as based in their home ports and imposed its 
tax on all of them, making the California tax an additional tax, and contrasted the 
property tax with income-based taxes that could be more readily apportioned. /d. 
"The Court's decision in Container Corp. effectively modified, for purposes of income 
taxation, the Commerce Clause multiple taxation inquiry described in Japan Lines, 
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franchise tax law assessing income of multinational corporations operating 
in the state even though the state's apportionment reached a higher portion 
of that income than did the methodology used by many other states and 
nationsY 
The Court's "one voice" inquiry was satisfied in the later cases by the 
lack of any preemptive congressional legislation or treaties. 58 Even when 
the executive indicated its opposition to the imposition of a 
nondiscriminatory tax on foreign commerce, the Court still sustained the 
tax. 59 The Court viewed commerce as a congressional domain and held 
that Congress may indicate that state practices affecting foreign commerce 
are permissible more passively and with less clarity than would be 
necessary to uphold discriminatory or very burdensome state laws.60 The 
taxes did not violate any international agreements, and Congress was 
aware of the state taxes-either exempting them from agreements or 
refusing to enact legislation that would have superseded the state power.61 
The "one voice" of the nation is no barrier to state action where there is 
only silence from the relevant federal government branch. In short, the 
Court is unlikely to invalidate nondiscriminatory taxes and regulations 
passed by states that incidentally affect foreign nations without some 
support by congressional or executive action. The privilege or immunity of 
United States citizens is access to international commerce without 
discriminatory state regulation, not access without any state regulation at 
all. 
2. The Intersection of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and 
Foreign Affairs: State Boycotts of Foreign Goods and the Market 
Participant Exception 
As a participant in the market, the state or its subdivisions may make 
Ltd." Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 319 n.18. 
57. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 302--07,311--12. 
58. See, e.g., id. at 328--31; see also Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of 
Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6, 8--9 (1986). 
59. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328--31. 
60. /d. at 323. 
61. See Wardair, 477 U.S. at 6 ("In the present case, not only is there no 
indication that Congress wished to preclude state sales taxation of airline fuel, but, to 
the contrary, the Act expressly permits states to impose such taxes."); see also Barclays 
Bank, 512 U.S. at 329 ("Congress has focused its attention on the issue, but has 
refrained from exercising its authority to prohibit state-mandated world-wide 
combined reporting."). 
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investments, purchases, or sales that exclude all outsiders, whether from 
another state or another nation. 62 These entities cannot require others to 
boycott, because that discrimination would be a regulation that interferes 
with foreign commerce. Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause applies to 
downstream regulation; for example, contractual conditions imposed by 
the state to control the subsequent behavior of those contracting with it. 63 
If the state does not use a contractual condition but simply refuses to deal 
with someone who comes from a disfavored nation or who has done 
business in that nation, it becomes more difficult to determine whether a 
state is regulating impermissibly or is merely participating in the market. 64 
The constitutionality of using local and state boycotts to affect the 
foreign policy of other nations has been the subject of scholarly debate65 
and conflicting state and lower court decisions. 66 Such a law does not 
62. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1980) (restrictions by the 
state on sales of its state-produced cement to state residents involve participation in the 
market and are not subject to dormant Commerce Clause analysis); see generally David 
S. Bogen, The Market Participant Doctrine and the Clear Statement Rule, 29 SEATTLE 
U. L. REv. 543 (2006) (explaining that the market participant doctrine is analogous to 
the clear statement rule, and preventing "the federal government from ordering states 
to make specific purchases or sales without a congressional determination that such 
regulation is necessary ... poses no threat to interstate commerce in the light of other 
safeguards"). But cf J.T. Hutchens, The Market-Participant Exception and the 
Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 445, 476-
77 (2007) (arguing that the market participant exception should not apply to foreign 
commerce because "[t]he particular concerns raised by foreign commerce trump the 
notions of fairness and federalism that might be advanced by granting states the power 
to restrict international trade"). 
63. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99-101 (1984) 
(restrictions on purchaser's subsequent use of timber are regulations and should be 
judged by dormant Commerce Clause standards). 
64. See Bogen, supra note 61, at 576-77 (explaining that refusals to deal can 
sometimes allow states to, in effect, accomplish the same goals of downstream 
regulation without suffering invalidation by the Court). 
65. See, e.g., Brandon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality 
of State and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States' 
Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 310 (1999) (arguing 
that "state and local ... involvement in foreign affairs ... violates the structural 
allocation of power ... [and] ... impermissibly burden[s] foreign commerce"); Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1624-
25 (1997) (arguing that federal common law of foreign relations lacks justification and 
state law should not be invalidated by judicial regulation); Wilson, supra note 52, at 
786-89 (arguing that preemption should be preferred and state policies sustained in the 
absence of federal action). 
66. See, e.g., Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 908-09 (3d Cir. 
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violate any express provision of the Constitution-it is neither part of any 
agreement with a foreign country nor a tax on importing or exporting 
goods. The law may escape the dormant Commerce Clause because the 
state is acting as a market participant; however, the Court has not dealt 
with boycotts that directly target other states by name. Such a boycott 
would abridge the Article IV privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
targeted state.67 It would create friction that conflicts with the 
constitutional policy of union, and would not be justified by concern for the 
state's own citizens. 68 For those reasons, the Court might also find that one 
state's boycott of the products of a named state would be outside the 
market participant doctrine. There is no similar policy of union with 
respect to foreign relations; however, there is federal preeminence in the 
area. 69 
The federal government sets foreign policy for the nation; states are 
forbidden from entering into treaties with foreign governments, 70 and even 
compacts require congressional consent. 71 In the few cases that have 
reached the Supreme Court involving state laws targeted at activities in a 
particular foreign country, the Court has used preemption rather than 
dormant Commerce Clause or equal protection analysis. Where the 
federal government has set foreign policy with respect to a particular issue, 
the Court has found state laws preempted by the federal policy, even 
1990) (upholding a law requiring companies supplying public works projects to use 
American steel); Bd. of Trs. of the Employees' Ret. Sys. of Bait. v. Mayor of Baltimore 
City, 562 A.2d 720, 732-33 (Md. 1989) (upholding an ordinance that required city 
pension funds to divest from South African companies); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. 
v. N.J. Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774, 788-89 (N.J. 1977) (upholding a 
New Jersey "Buy American" statute). But cf Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305-08 (Ill. 1986) (striking down a state tax exemption for 
rare coins that discriminatorily excluded the South African Krugerrand). 
67. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 
208, 221-22 (1984) (applying Article IV to exclusionary market participant behavior of 
the city of Camden and requiring justification for that behavior). 
68. A reciprocity provision in a state purchasing law might, however, survive 
scrutiny as an attempt to open the market for the state's citizens, which is directly 
related to the reasons for the market preference for in-state residents. This is quite 
different from a provision designed to affect the state's policies in unrelated areas. See 
infra Part III.A.3. 
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
70. See id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, 
or Confederation .... "). 
71. See id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a 
foreign Power .... "). 
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though compliance with both laws would be possible. 72 Of course, the 
federal government may authorize state and local boycotts instead of, or in 
addition to, acting itself. 73 
When the federal government has taken no action, it is not clear that 
state boycotts of foreign nations conflict with federal policy. Congressional 
silence indicates nothing, and there is no constitutional presumption 
against state boycotts of foreign goods because there is no constitutional 
interest in promoting the interests of foreign governments. Like other 
market participants, the state's refusal to trade does not necessarily involve 
a government function that would create problems for the nation. The 
pressure brought by such boycotts depends on others joining them, and 
diverse boycott actions by various states and localities are likely to add to 
the bargaining power of the federal executive. The boycotted nation is 
probably behaving badly, and localized minor pressure may be desirable.74 
Nevertheless, state boycott laws directly impinge on citizens of the 
United States when the state's refusal to trade also applies to persons who 
do business with the disfavored nation or nations. Although boycotting the 
product of the boycotted nation, regardless of who sells it, limits the 
market for resale of the goods, it does not otherwise impair the decision of 
the United States citizen to deal with the boycotted country. However, 
boycotting a company because it has, in an unrelated deal, purchased goods 
from the boycotted nation pushes foreign policy into an attempt to control 
the behavior of United States citizens. The foreign Commerce Clause was 
not enacted to benefit foreign nations, but it was enacted to benefit citizens 
of the United States who wanted to trade with foreign nations. From the 
perspective of this section-that access to international trade is a privilege 
or immunity of citizens of the United States that cannot be abridged by 
72. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74 (2000) 
(holding a state law barring state entities from buying goods or services from 
companies doing business with Burma [Myanmar] was preempted by federal statute 
imposing restrictions on trade with Burma and delegating authority to the President in 
this area); American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-20 (2003) (holding a 
state requirement that insurance companies disclose past operations in Europe before 
end of World War II was preempted by executive agreements establishing a forum for 
resolving claims concerning such operations). 
73. For example, recent federal legislation imposing a ban on federal 
investment and trade in Sudan-in connection with events in Darfur-makes specific 
provision for states and localities to decide whether to boycott Sudan in their market 
decisions. See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 
§ 3, 121 Stat. 2516. 
74. ld. 
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states-a state's economic boycott of companies that do business with a 
boycotted nation violates the foreign Commerce Clause. 
3. The Foreign Affairs Power 
Although citizens are free from discriminatory state taxes or 
regulations that might interfere with their trade in foreign commerce, states 
and localities have attempted to restrict citizens' interaction with foreign 
nations and foreign nationals in other ways. 75 States argue that activities 
wholly within the state, such as employment, land ownership, or other local 
business arrangements, are local matters rather than foreign commerce, 
and that the state may exclude aliens from participation. 76 The privilege or 
immunity of citizens to deal with aliens free of state impediments in these 
areas comes primarily from the centralization of foreign affairs powers in 
the federal government. 77 
Unlike the right to travel interstate, which limits congressional power, 
the privilege of access to foreign commerce is derived from the grant of 
power to Congress; thus, Congress is free to regulate and restrict 
individuals-the nature of the privilege is to be free from state 
interference, not from federal action. Nevertheless, the Constitution 
secures the right of a citizen to engage in foreign commerce without 
interference from the state by placing the authority to regulate that 
commerce, and authority over aliens and foreign relations, in the federal 
government. In this respect, citizens of the United States can claim a 
privilege or immunity from state regulations that would hinder them from 
transacting business in foreign commerce or in dealing with aliens or 
foreign companies within the state. 
Exclusion laws impinge on United States citizens who might want to 
employ aliens; thus, the Supreme Court has struck down many such laws as 
breaches of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 78 
75. See infra notes 79-84. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1984) (invalidating a 
citizenship requirement for becoming a notary public); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 
727-29 (1973) (striking down a state law excluding aliens from being licensed 
attorneys); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding a state law 
denying welfare benefits to aliens violates equal protection). The Court's strict 
scrutiny of alienage classifications does not apply to classifications related to self-
government and the democratic process. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 
(1978) (upholding a state statute requiring members of police force to be United States 
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In this context, the Court pointed out that exclusionary laws conflict with 
federal immigration policy, which permits aliens to be present.79 The basic 
decision whether such persons should be in the country and have access to 
opportunities is a decision for the federal government. 80 
State laws restricting alien ownership of real property within the state 
pose further issues. In 1923, the Court held that states have a special public 
interest in regulating land in the state and could exclude aliens from land 
ownership. 81 The Court has not overturned this decision, 82 and there have 
been no recent challenges.83 Whether a state will permit aliens to hold 
property is a matter for each state to decide unless there is relevant federal 
action. A total exclusion of nonresident aliens from holding land may not 
be offensive to any particular foreign country, but state policies that 
distinguish between foreign countries are more likely to conflict with 
federal policies in foreign affairs. Simple reciprocity rules may not offend 
foreign nations, but an examination of the fairness of the foreign legal 
system could easily do so. 84 Thus, the Court has indicated that it will weigh 
citizens). 
79. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 377-78. Discrimination by the federal 
government against aliens is not subject to strict scrutiny because it may be an exercise 
of its immigration or foreign relations powers, which permits discretion. See Mathews 
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976). 
80. Federal power over immigration comes from the grant to Congress of 
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For the 
power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, see id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and for the 
inference from the prohibition of migration desired by the states prior to 1808, see id. 
at art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
81. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217-21 (1923). 
82. The Court did, however, strike down a state statute that presumed land 
transfers to citizens paid for by ineligible aliens were illegal attempts to transfer 
property to the alien. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 645--47 (1948). 
83. Many bilateral treaties secure inheritance rights for aliens. Consequently, 
the issue can arise only when no such agreement has been reached. 
84. In Clark v. Allen, the Court said that inheritance law was a matter of state 
concern, and it upheld a California law that prohibited aliens from taking property 
unless their native country allowed foreign citizens to inherit or hold property. Clark v. 
Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1947). Congress had not forbidden such a reciprocity rule, 
and no express provision of the Constitution precluded it. Id. Nevertheless, the Court 
struck down a similar Oregon law, saying that it unduly interfered with the federal 
government's conduct of foreign affairs. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). 
Justice Douglas, who wrote both opinions, distinguished the cases on the basis of the 
degree of intrusion into foreign affairs. See id. at 432-33. He characterized Clark as a 
facial challenge to the statute, and the Court assumed that the representation of the 
foreign government as to reciprocity would govern. Id. at 433. The reciprocity law of 
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the impact on foreign relations against the state's local interest.S5 
B. Protection of Life, Liberty, and Property Abroad 
Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the 
care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty, 
and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a 
foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor that the right 
depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States.s6 
1071 
The protection of life, liberty, and property is one of the fundamental 
rights of citizens. Within the jurisdiction of a state, it is a privilege or 
immunity of state citizenship and not of citizenship of the United States 
because the state is the source for such protections.87 Outside the state's 
jurisdiction, however, that protection is the responsibility of the federal 
government. Thus, Miller wrote that: 
Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the 
care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty, 
and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a 
foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor that the right 
depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States.88 
The privilege or immunity of protection abroad has a variety of 
Oregon in Zschernig insisted that the foreign government permit foreign citizens to 
inherit or hold property '"without confiscation."' !d. at 431. Douglas found this 
provision required courts to examine the policies and legal systems of the foreign 
nation under Oregon law, which could lead to international friction by the Court's 
characterization of those systems. !d. at 433-35. 
85. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 ("The Oregon law does, indeed, illustrate the 
dangers which are involved if each State, speaking through its probate courts, is 
permitted to establish its own foreign policy."). 
86. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872). 
87. See id. at 77 ("But with the exception of these and a few other restrictions, 
the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States ... lay 
within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the 
Federal government."). The provision for the security of person and property is a 
fundamental purpose of state existence, and failure to achieve this goal is a reason for a 
state's citizens to vote the legislators out of office; however, courts will not intervene to 
correct the failure because there is so much discretion in the means for affording these 
protections. Courts are more institutionally suited to enforce negative rights. At the 
state level, state courts will enforce the restrictions of state constitutions. 
88. ld. at 79. 
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elements-the ability of the individual to travel to a foreign nation, the 
application of United States law to events that occur in that country, and 
the efforts of the federal government to secure protection for United States 
citizens from the foreign nation. 
1. The Privilege or Immunity of International Travel 
The right to travel abroad is a correlative of the federal government's 
role as the source of protection abroad. A citizen has to travel abroad in 
order to receive protection in a foreign jurisdiction, and international travel 
is fundamental to access to foreign commerce as well. The Court has 
recognized a right to international travel, saying "The right to travel is a 
part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due 
process of law under the Fifth Amendment." 89 However, the court 
subsequently distinguished the right to travel domestically and 
internationally, noting that the constitutional right of interstate travel is 
"'virtually unqualified,"' but the "'right"' of international travel can be 
regulated within the bounds of due process. 90 
Statutes have required persons to have passports for international 
travel at some times and to some places. 91 That regulation is primarily 
justified as part of the foreign policy of the United States. 92 "Revocation of 
a passport undeniably curtails travel, but the freedom to travel abroad with 
a 'letter of introduction' in the form of a passport issued by the sovereign is 
subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations; as such, 
it is subject to reasonable governmental regulation. "93 In view of the 
deference that the Court pays to the federal government's foreign policy 
89. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). 
90. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Califano v. Aznovarian, 
439 u.s. 170, 176 (1978)). 
91. For example, it was a crime to travel outside the Western Hemisphere or 
to Cuba without a passport. See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964). 
Pursuant to statute, the Secretary of State became the sole issuer of passports in 1856. 
See Haig, 453 U.S. at 294. Initially a document for the benefit of the bearer, the 
passport became a necessary document for travel during wartime and later for 
international travel at any time, at least to certain parts of the world. /d. at 293 ("[T]he 
only means by which an American can lawfully leave the country or return to it-
absent a Presidentially granted exception-is with a passport."); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1185(b) (2000). 
92. See Haig, 453 U.S. at 307 ("Protection of the foreign policy of the United 
States is a governmental interest of great importance, since foreign policy and national 
security considerations cannot neatly be compartmentalized."). 
93. /d. at 306. 
HeinOnline -- 56 Drake L. Rev.  1073 2007-20082
2008] Privileges or Immunities of U.S. Citizens Internationally 1073 
decisions, the federal government has broad power to limit international 
travel. Thus, the Court has upheld geographical restrictions on passports 
to avoid the risk of involving the United States in "dangerous international 
incidents."94 Most of the successful arguments challenging the denial of 
passports question whether the government acted in a procedurally correct 
manner, rather than whether the federal government had the power to 
deny a citizen a passport. 95 
The deference paid to federal foreign policy decisions should not 
impair the understanding that international travel is a fundamental right 
and, thus, a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States. 
Protection of that right requires the United States to interact with foreign 
nations. Although courts are not appropriate institutions to review foreign 
policy, they may be the appropriate forum to determine whether the 
federal government is acting for reasons of foreign policy or is curtailing 
travel for inappropriate domestic reasons. The procedural protections 
available for individual citizens are important to ensure that restrictions are 
legitimate. 
States cannot justify restricting international travel on foreign policy 
grounds because foreign policy is primarily a federal matter, much like the 
admission of aliens. Without such a justification, states are precluded from 
interfering with the right of citizens of the United States to travel 
internationally. Thus, international travel, like interstate travel, is a 
privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States. 
2. Application of United States Law Abroad 
The citizen abroad is likely to be subject to the laws of the nation 
where he or she is present rather than the laws of the United States. 
Nevertheless, there are several bases for asserting federal jurisdiction over 
acts committed outside the United States, including the citizenship of the 
actor or the object of the act. Congress has acted on this premise in several 
instances. Thus, Congress has extended antidiscrimination laws to apply to 
94. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) ("[T]he Secretary has justifiably 
concluded that travel to Cuba by American citizens might involve the Nation in 
dangerous international incidents, and that the Constitution does not require him to 
validate passports for such travel."). 
95. See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505-08 (stating that denial of passports on the 
basis of membership in registered Communist association is invalid for overbreadth); 
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (stating that Congress did not confer 
authority on the Secretary of State to deny passports because of Communist beliefs and 
associations). 
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United States corporations that discriminate against citizens of the United 
States, even when that discrimination occurs in other countries. 96 Congress 
has also made certain acts criminal under federal law when committed 
against a United States citizen outside the United States. 97 Such federal 
statutes must be consistent with the Constitution. Further, the citizen is 
entitled to the individual rights and protections of the Constitution if tried 
in a United States tribunal abroad. 98 However, as Justice Miller held in 
1886, the illegality of the kidnapping of a person in a foreign country to 
bring him before a court in the United States does not prevent trial or 
make it a violation of due process. 99 
The ability of the United States to criminalize and punish acts 
committed outside of its boundaries is limited by the sovereignty of the 
nation where the acts occurred. There are jurisdictional problems in the 
reach of the law and potential conflicts with the law of the nation where the 
events occur. Equally important, the perpetrator may remain outside the 
United States and largely beyond its reach. According to the Foreign 
96. See Paul Frantz, International Employment: Antidiscrimination Law 
Should Follow Employees Abroad, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 227, 228-29 (2005) 
(identifying laws that apply abroad to citizens working for U.S. companies and urging 
application to lawful permanent residents as well). 
97. For example, taking United States nationals hostage violates the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over hostage crimes committed by or against United States nationals. Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 2002(a), 98 Stat. 2186 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000)). 
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 makes it a crime to 
conspire to commit homicide against a U.S. national with the intent to coerce, 
intimidate, or retaliate against a government or civilian population. Pub. L. No. 99-399, 
§ 1202(a), 100 Stat. 896 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2000)). 
98. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). Whether such protections 
apply to aliens has been a subject of controversy. See J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and 
Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 464-65 (2007) (arguing 
against application of the Constitution to aliens abroad); Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, 
Note, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial Power and the United States 
Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 147, 148-50 (1999) (arguing for application 
of the Constitution to exercises of United States sovereignty abroad and actions done 
in official capacity with host country consent). 
99. SeeKer v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 441-44 (1886) (holding, in the case of a 
criminal who had fled to Peru and was abducted back to the United States, that a 
treaty's extradition terms did not allow a party to find asylum in the country to which 
he has fled); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) 
(holding that a Mexican citizen abducted and brought to the United States could be 
tried in United States courts); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1952) (upholding 
the Michigan conviction of a person kidnapped from Chicago by Michigan officers to 
bring him before court). 
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Sovereign Immunities Act and the foreign policy principles it represents, 
foreign sovereigns that injure U.S. citizens may be beyond the jurisdiction 
of American courts. 100 The legality of behavior usually depends on the law 
of the jurisdiction; normally the law of the country where the act takes 
place governs protection of life, liberty, and property, and that nation is 
primarily responsible for its enforcement. In short, the bulk of the 
protection of United States citizens abroad occurs abroad. 
3. Securing Fundamental Rights from Foreign Nations 
Congress recognized its obligation to protect the fundamental rights 
of United States citizens from infringement by foreign nations and, in the 
Hostage Act, authorized the President to take action short of acts of war to 
secure the release of American citizens unjustly detained by foreign 
governments. 101 The Hostage Act empowers the President to act, but it 
100. Chapter 97 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 reads in part: 
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a 
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as 
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter. 
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000). Section 1605 of the Act provides a commercial exception that 
withdraws immunity from a foreign state if it is carrying on a commercial activity in the 
United States; performing an act in the United States in connection with its commercial 
activity elsewhere; or conducting an act outside the United States that has a direct 
effect in the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see also Amelia L. McCarthy, 
Comment, The Commercial Activity Exception-Justice Demands Congress Define a 
Line in the Shifting Sands of Sovereign Immunity, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 893, 913 (1994) 
(urging that the FSIA exception for commercial activity be extended to international 
human rights violations in employment contexts). 
101. The Hostage Act provides: 
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United 
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of 
any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to 
demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it 
appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, 
the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the 
release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall 
use such means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by 
law, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; 
and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable 
be communicated by the President to Congress. 
22 u.s.c. § 1732 (2000). 
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does not require executive action. 102 The duty to protect American citizens 
is confided to the discretion of the President. 103 
Justice Miller suggested in In re Neagle that the duty of the executive 
to "'take care that the laws [are] faithfully executed"' was not limited to 
express provisions in the law, but included "the rights, duties and 
obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international 
relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government 
under the Constitution." 104 As one example, Miller related with approval 
how an American naval officer used threats of force to secure the release 
of a confined man who had declared his intention to become a United 
States citizen.ws 
Military force, treaties, negotiations, letters, and intermediaries are all 
methods that might be used to secure protection for citizens, and the 
political branches have discretion to determine what method is best under 
the circumstances. Representatives of the United States government may 
simply talk to the foreign government, employ sanctions, or offer assistance 
to those governments to gain their agreement to protect United States 
citizens. Agreements of the United States may protect its citizens abroad, 
and those agreements may be enforced in the courts of other nations. Such 
agreements will be reciprocal in nature; provisions, such as the notification 
of counsel when a national is arrested, need to be enforced domestically as 
a mechanism for securing protections for one's own citizens abroad. 106 At 
the extreme, a government may send troops to rescue its citizens from 
102. See Kevin D. Hughes, Hostages' Rights: The Unhappy Legal Predicament 
of an American Held in Foreign Captivity, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 555, 564 
(1993) (discussing contemporary Supreme Court dicta which "places no requirements 
on the President in hostage-taking situations"); cf Abner J. Mikva & Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and the "Hostage Act", 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 292,344 (1982) 
("The President is given broad discretion in choosing among diplomatic, military, and 
economic means of bringing pressure or influence to bear on a foreign state that has 
imprisoned American citizens unlawfully. His response must be within constitutional 
bounds ... and must be a direct means [against] the foreign state .... "). 
103. "[A]s it respects the interposition of the executive abroad, for the 
protection of the lives or property of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity, rest in the 
discretion of the president." Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) 
(No. 4186) (approval of United States troops bombarding and setting fire to a town in 
Nicaragua to redress threats to an American diplomat and to property in which 
Americans had an interest). 
104. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 4). 
105. !d. 
106. Domestic law may make that enforcement difficult, as seen in Medellin v. 
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008), discussed infra Part III.C. 
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harm.Jo? 
The Iranian hostage issue provides examples of the various means 
that the executive may use to protect its citizens abroad. When American 
diplomats were seized and held hostage in Iran in November of 1979, 
President Carter issued an order freezing all the assets of Iran in the 
United States.108 He demanded the hostages' release and obtained a 
resolution of the United Nations Security Council calling for their 
release. 109 The United States also brought an application against Iran in 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 110 While the international case 
was pending, the U.S. military made an abortive attempt to rescue the 
hostages. 111 The ICJ held that Iran had breached its obligations under 
international law and the hostages should be released. 112 Finally, the 
President negotiated an agreement with Iran to free the hostages. The 
agreement established a claims tribunal and called for suspension of all 
claims by United States citizens that could be presented to that tribunal. 113 
Thus, the President used negotiation, economic sanctions, military force, 
international law, and international bodies to protect United States 
citizens. The Supreme Court upheld the President's suspension of claims 
in federal and state courts because the executive agreement with Iran was 
sustained by congressional acquiescence and support. 114 
107. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text for a discussion of this 
point in Durand and Neagle. See also U.S. Dep't of State, Right to Protect Citizens in 
Foreign Countries by Landing Forces 44-48 (3d rev. ed. 1934) (Memorandum of the 
Solicitor); PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW 213 (2002) ("The President's authority to use the armed forces to 
protect American diplomats, nationals and property is therefore well-established and 
does not seem to be at least generally controversial."). 
108. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,662-63 (1981). 
109. See S.C. Res. 457, U.N. Doc. S/RES/457 (Dec. 4, 1979); S.C. Res. 461, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/461 (Dec. 31, 1979). 
110. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States 
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24). 
111. For a discussion of the failed rescue attempt, see Charles T. Kamps, 
Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, AIR & SPACE POWER J.-
ESPANOL, Fall 2006 (English version in the Spanish edition), available at 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.miUapjinternationaUapj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html. 
See also Mark Bowden, The Desert One Debacle, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2006, at 
62. 
112. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 
42-43, 45-46. 
113. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665-66. 
114. See id. at 677-82. 
HeinOnline -- 56 Drake L. Rev.  1078 2007-20082
1078 Drake Law Review [Vol. 56 
The Court has observed that matters relating "to the conduct of 
foreign relations ... are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of 
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference." 115 Invasion of another country may jeopardize the security 
of many other individuals and wreak havoc with American interests 
abroad. No court would order a President to take such an action. Further, 
there are no objective standards for federal intervention that are amenable 
to judicial action. "Matters intimately related to foreign policy and 
national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention."116 As 
a result, the privilege of international protection is not judicially 
enforceable against the United States. 117 
The inability of courts to compel the federal government to protect 
citizens abroad does not make the privilege meaningless. The privilege or 
immunity is the federal government's power to act, its moral obligation to 
do so, and the prohibition on state interference with such actions. Thus, on 
its face, a United States passport provides international travelers with both 
identification and needed documents for travel that request foreign 
governments to respect the holder. 118 "Even under a travel control 
statute . . . a passport remains in a sense a document by which the 
Government vouches for the bearer and for his conduct."119 In practice, 
when citizens' persons or property are endangered abroad, the government 
recognizes its obligation and acts on their behalf. 
Further, the courts would support the federal government by stopping 
any attempt by a state to interfere with the federal government's acts 
abroad. For example, Miller held in Neagle that states could not try a man 
for murder under state law because the killing occurred while he was acting 
115. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,589 (1952) (citations omitted). 
116. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). 
117. Compare the attempt in Australia to compel the Australian government 
to intervene on behalf of Australian citizen David Hicks, who was held in Guantanamo 
by the United States. Mr. Hicks was released before the Australian courts reached the 
case, so it was dismissed as moot. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, Australia Terrorism 
Detainee Leaves Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,2007, at A7. 
118. See Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692,698 (1835) ("[A passport] is 
a document, which, from its nature and object, is addressed to foreign powers; 
purporting only to be a request, that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely; and is 
to be considered rather in the character of a political document, by which the bearer is 
recognised, in foreign countries, as an American citizen; and which, by usage and the 
law of nations, is received as evidence of the fact."); see also Haig, 453 U.S. at 292-93. 
119. Haig, 453 U.S. at 293. 
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as a bodyguard for a federal judge. 120 His opm10n analogized the 
bodyguard's action to the behavior of the executive protecting citizens 
abroad. 121 Thus, it seems clear that states cannot interfere with the 
provision of federal protection. This is so apparent that there is little 
litigation on the subject, but it does not make the privilege any less 
important. 
C. Treaty Rights 
[A ]ll rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations, are 
dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of 
a State. 122 
[A] treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon 
the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial 
limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and 
which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the 
courts of the country. . . . But even in this aspect of the case there is 
nothing in this law which makes it irrepealable or unchangeable. The 
Constitution gives it no superiority over an act of Congress in this 
respect, which may be repealed or modified by an act of a later date. 123 
A third privilege of citizens of the United States is the right that 
citizens obtain under treaties with foreign countries. The Constitution 
provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur .... " 124 As Justice Miller noted, "all rights 
secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations, are dependent upon 
citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of a State." 125 
Treaty rights under international law are generally enforceable only 
by nations, even in international courts. 126 But, the Supremacy Clause of 
120. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75-76 (1890). 
121. See id. at 64. 
122. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1872). 
123. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). 
124. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
125. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80. 
126. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of 
Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1086-97 (1992) (explaining this particularity of 
international law exists because in that legal order, only sovereign states-not 
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the Constitution provides that treaties "shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby .... " 127 That 
means, for purposes of United States domestic law, individuals may raise 
treaty provisions when relevant in their case and state officials and state 
courts must honor them. Thus, Miller noted: 
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights 
upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the 
territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal 
law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties 
in the courts of the country .... A treaty, then, is a law of the land as 
an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which 
the rights of the citizen or subject may be determined. And when such 
rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court 
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it 
would to a statute. 128 
Nevertheless, there are a variety of issues about whether particular 
treaty provisions "prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen 
or subject may be determined," and when such a right is "of a nature to be 
enforced in a court of justice." 129 For instance, the treaty may not create an 
individual right, sovereign immunity may preclude bringing suit, and even 
individual rights may not be domestic law because they are not self-
executing provisions of a treaty. 
Not every provision of a treaty creates an individual right in citizens. 
In the Head Money Cases, Justice Miller pointed out that nations and not 
individuals are the parties to a treaty, and nations enforce most treaties 
through negotiations in which courts play no role. 130 Many treaty 
provisions are designed for government enforcement, and individuals may 
lack standing to raise them. For example, treaties banning nuclear 
weapons testing or providing mutual support in the event of hostilities are 
for the political branches to enforce. 
Even if a treaty contains a provision for individual rights, citizens may 
be barred by sovereign immunity from suing to enforce treaty provisions. 
States have sovereign immunity from suit by individual citizens, except in 
individuals-have rights and duties). 
127. U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2. 
128. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99. 
129. !d. at 599. 
130. See id. at 598. 
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limited situations. 131 Foreign nations also have sovereign immunity from 
suits under FSIA in many instances. 132 Nevertheless, citizens can assert the 
privilege or immunity of treaty rights in private litigation or as a defense to 
block application of state laws that violate treaty provisions. Citizens may 
even be able to enjoin enforcement of such laws without raising the specter 
of sovereign immunity.l33 
Perhaps the most important limit on treaty enforcement is the 
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing provisions. As 
the Court said in Foster v. Neilson: 
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, 
consequently, to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an 
act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of 
any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import 
a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular 
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial 
department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can 
become a rule for the Court. 134 
An agreement that requires further action by its terms, or the terms 
of its ratification, is not self-executing. 135 Thus, many treaties do not create 
immediately applicable domestic law. Agreements that require the 
appropriation of money will not be effective domestically until Congress 
131. See U.S. CaNST. amend. XI; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1890) 
(holding sovereign immunity precludes suits by citizens against their own states even 
though the Eleventh Amendment is limited to suits against a state by citizens of 
another state); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (Indian 
tribe barred from suing state by Eleventh Amendment despite statute enacted under 
Indian Commerce Clause conferring jurisdiction); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 
330-32 (1934) (holding that foreign states are also barred from suing states for money 
damages). The Court would probably treat a treaty as it treats legislation enacted 
under other congressional powers and, thus, the citizen is unlikely to be able to sue the 
state for its violation of treaty provisions. 
132. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
133. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908) (injunction to restrain state 
official is not a suit against the state contrary to sovereign immunity). 
134. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled in part on 
other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (modifying the 
treaty construction in Foster based upon textual variances brought to light by 
subsequent translation of original Spanish version of treaty). 
135. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES§ 111(4)(b) (1987) (providing that a treaty is non-self-executing "if the 
Senate in giving consent to a treaty ... requires implementing legislation"). 
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has appropriated the money. 136 Similarly, Congress must enact a statute 
before conduct can be a federal crime. Other agreements may be merely 
hortatory or too vague for judicial enforcement. 137 Such non-self-executing 
agreements are binding under international law, but courts of the United 
States will not enforce them unless their provisions have been implemented 
by further action of Congress. 
Although self-executing treaties are law that must be followed by 
state courts, the federal government is not equally bound to observe them. 
As Justice Miller said in the Head Money Cases, "there is nothing in this 
law which makes it irrepealable or unchangeable. In this respect, the 
Constitution gives it no superiority over an act of Congress, which may be 
repealed or modified by an act of a later date." 138 Thus, Congress may pass 
a law that conflicts with a treaty provision, and the subsequent statute 
prevails over the treaty as a matter of United States law. 139 Even when 
breach of a treaty is a breach of international law, it is not a breach of 
United States law for the President or Congress to act within their 
constitutional powers and breach an international treaty. 140 These results 
are a consequence of entrusting the entire treaty power to the federal 
government, while giving it authority to accomplish other ends that may be 
inconsistent with an agreement it initially made. However, as long as the 
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .... "). 
137. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing 
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 713-15 (1995) (discussing the dilemma facing courts 
and individuals seeking enforcement when a treaty's provisions merely encourage 
legislative action or are too vague to determine what conduct constitutes violation). 
138. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,599 (1884). 
139. Id. 
140. There remains a significant question whether and under what 
circumstances a President may terminate a treaty. Compare John Yoo, Politics as 
Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty 
Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 873 (2001) (reviewing FRANCES FITZGERALD, 
WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS AND THE END OF THE COLD 
WAR (2000)) (asserting Presidential power to terminate), with Michael P. Van Alstine, 
The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1271-72 n.57 (2002) 
(suggesting limits on power to terminate treaties that create individually enforceable 
rights); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 649, 655-56 (2000) (arguing that executive branch power to unilaterally terminate 
a treaty is still an unsettled issue). In many instances, courts would be reluctant to 
intervene with decisions of the Executive Branch. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 
996 (1979) (vacating Court of Appeals' decision on President's termination of a treaty 
with Taiwan as moot). Nevertheless, the issue could be different with respect to 
provisions conferring individual rights, especially in establishing commercial law. 
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treaty has not been altered by inconsistent action on the federal level, the 
states are bound by its terms. 141 
The Court's recent decision in Medellin v. Texas dramatically 
illustrates the difference between self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaty provisions by imposing significant limits on presidential power to 
implement treaties or to resolve international disputes. 142 The Court held 
that the provision in the United Nations Charter by which the United 
States agreed to comply with decisions of the ICJ was not self-executing, 
and that ICJ decisions were not laws of the United States until Congress 
enacted a law enforcing them. 143 Because they were not domestic law, the 
President lacked power to enforce them. 144 
Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national, was arrested in Texas for the 
rape and murder of two young women. 145 He was advised of his right to an 
attorney, but not of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations to have the Mexican consulate notified of his detention. 146 He 
confessed, was later convicted of capital murder, and his conviction was 
affirmed on appeal. 147 He first raised the Vienna Convention claim in 
postconviction proceedings, but the state court held the claim was barred 
because he had failed to raise it at trial or on direct review. 148 
Mexico filed an application in the ICJ with respect to Medellin and 
fifty other Mexican nationals facing the death penalty (including Avena, 
who was first alphabetically). 149 In the A vena case, the ICJ said that the 
right to consular notification under the Vienna Convention was an 
141. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 483,488-89 (1879). 
142. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
143. I d. at 1356--57; see also id. at 1368 ("The President has an array of political 
and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally 
converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them. 
The responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-
executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress."). 
144. Id. at 1368. 
145. ld. at 1354. 
146. Id.; see also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
147. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1354. 
148. Id. That was a sufficient ground according to the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Breard v. Greene, which held that state procedural rules could bar the 
defendant from raising a breach of a self-executing provision of a treaty. Breard v. 
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam). 
149. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1352. 
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individual right, that the United States had violated it, and that the United 
States must review the convictions to determine whether the violation of 
the Convention prejudiced the defendants-the U.S. could not allow 
procedural default rules to bar such a review. 150 However, in 2006 the 
Supreme Court held in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon that rights under the 
Convention were subject to state court procedural default rules. 151 
Because Sanchez-Llamas precluded Medellin from arguing that the 
Convention required review of his conviction, he argued instead that the 
United States was bound by Article 94(1) of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which states that "'[e]ach Member of the United Nations 
undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it 
is a party."' 152 Further, he argued that his case was governed by a 
memorandum issued by President Bush enforcing the ICJ decision, which 
stated that the United States would discharge its international 
responsibilities by having state courts give effect to the ICJ decision in 
A vena with respect to the fifty-one Mexican nationals involved in that 
application in accordance with general principles of comity. 153 
The Supreme Court rejected Medellin's contentions. 154 It held the 
150. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004I.C.J. 12, 59-60, 
70-72 (Mar. 31). 
151. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2687 (2006). The Court 
stated that "[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its 
interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts." !d. at 2684. It 
concluded that "claims under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention may be subjected to 
the same procedural default rules that apply generally to other federal-law claims." !d. 
at 2687; see also Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1352-53 ("In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon . .. we 
held that, contrary to the ICJ's determination, the Vienna Convention did not preclude 
the application of state default rules.") (citation omitted). In addition to the 
procedural bar, the Court held that even if consular notification was a self-executing 
provision of the Convention, the Convention did not provide any particular remedy for 
a breach. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2678. In this case, the Vienna Convention 
did not require the suppression of evidence obtained before consular notification. !d. 
152. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1354 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94(1)). 
153. See id. at 1353, 1367 (citing President George W. Bush's Memorandum for 
the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), the text of which is available at 
http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html). The case was 
initially filed immediately after Bush's memorandum, but the writ of certiorari was 
dismissed as "improvidently granted" because the state courts had not yet heard the 
motion filed after the memorandum. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 662 (2006). 
154. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 ("Because none of these treaty sources 
creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is 
uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the A vena judgment is not 
automatically binding domestic law."); see also id. at 1372 ("The President's 
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obligation of the United States to comply with a decision of the ICJ was not 
self-executing, but required congressional legislation. 155 It then held that 
the President lacked authority to implement non-self-executing treaty 
provisions because only Congress could make such provisions the law of 
the United States.ts6 
The Court in Medellin indicated that treaty provisions must "clearly" 
accord the treaty domestic effect in order for them to be self-executing.t57 
Whether treaty provisions should be presumed to be self-executing or 
presumed not to be self-executing has been a controversial issue. 158 
Although the Court's insistence on the clarity of the treaty's language and 
the need for political responsibility suggests a presumption against self-
executing treaties, the Court said "neither our approach nor our cases 
require that a treaty provide for self-execution in so many talismanic 
words .... " 159 The Court continued, "[o]ur cases simply require courts to 
decide whether a treaty's terms reflect a determination by the President 
who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has 
Memorandum is not supported by a 'particularly longstanding practice' of 
congressional acquiescence . . . . The Executive's narrow and s~rictly limited authority 
to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement cannot 
stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum.") (citations 
omitted). 
155. See id. at 1356-57. 
156. See id. at 1368; see also supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
157. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1369. 
158. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 760 
(1988) (arguing that the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties is inconsistent with the Constitution); David Sloss, Schizophrenic Treaty Law, 
43 TEx. INT'L L.J. 15, 16 (2007) (exploring the varied criteria for determining whether 
a treaty is self-executing under nationalist and transnationalist models and arguing 
against the nationalist position); David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually 
Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-
Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 20, 110-13 (2006) (analyzing the widespread 
acceptance in the lower courts of the nationalist presumption against self-executing 
treaties and the Supreme Court's need to resolve the issue in favor of the transnational 
model); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2156-
58 (1999) (arguing that text and doctrine support a presumption that treaties are self-
executing); Vazquez, supra note 126, at 1114--61 (arguing that the doctrine of self-
executing treaties is a mask for other distinct issues a court must examine in 
determining whether individuals can enforce a particular treaty); John C. Yoo, 
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original 
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (examining Framers' intent and 
arguing against judicial enforcement of treaties that are within the scope of 
congressional powers unless Congress enacts further implementing legislation). 
159. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1366. 
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domestic effect." 160 It distinguished the cases finding treaties to be self-
executing on the basis of the particular facts and treaty language 
involved. 161 The same may be said of Medellin itself, in which the finding 
of non-self-execution resulted from a number of different factors, including 
the term '"undertakes to comply,"' 162 the express provision of a diplomatic 
rather than judicial remedy, t63 and the views of the executive branch. 164 
Given past decisions that found treaties to be self-executing, clear 
statements of rights should presumptively be understood as self-executing. 
The Court has given effect to such statements in previous decisions and, 
therefore, the President and the Senate may be presumed to understand 
that they have domestic effect. 165 The privileges or immunities perspective 
suggests that citizens have a fundamental right to have their nations act 
internationally on their behalf, which seems to support the view that 
individual rights provisions should be presumed self-executing. Other 
factors or constitutional history might be persuasive to the contrary, but 
the contribution of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the debate is to 
urge participants to consider the individual as the object of government 
acts. 
D. Customary International Law 
[T]he question is as much within the province of the State court, as a 
160. !d. 
161. See id. at 1364-65. 
162. !d. at 1358 (quoting U.N. Charter at 94(1)); see id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he best reading of the words 'undertakes to comply' 
is, in my judgment, one that contemplates future action by the political branches."). 
163. !d. at 1359. 
164. See id. at 1361 ("The Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to its view 
that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law."). 
165. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191 (1961) (held property 
disposition to only living heirs, who resided in Yugoslavia, was valid under an 1881 
treaty between the United States and Serbia); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 128-30 
(1928) (holding that alien freedom to engage in business enterprise is based upon 
treaty construction in which obligations of the treaty should be liberally construed); 
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 420 (1886) (holding in regard to the 
extradition of the defendant that "in the treaty now under consideration, [the 
enumeration of offenses] is so specific, and marked by such a clear line in regard to the 
magnitude and importance of those offenses, that it is impossible to give any other 
interpretation to it than that of the exclusion of the right of extradition for any [other 
offenses]"); see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of 
Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 914-16 & nn.l39, 142-43 (2004) (canvassing 
Supreme Court opinions upholding self-executing treaties). 
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question ... of the law of nations, of which that court is bound to take 
notice, as it is of the courts of the United States. And ... it is [a 
subject] in which we [the Supreme Court] have no right to review their 
decision. 166 
1087 
Customary international law is another international privilege or 
immunity of citizens of the United States. International law consists of 
treaties and customary law.l67 In The Paquete Habana, Justice Gray wrote 
that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination." 168 Although Article VI of the Constitution states that 
treaties are the supreme law of the land in the United States, there is no 
similar statement about customary international law.l69 Unlike treaties, 
customary law is not created by express agreement ratified by the Senate or 
by the actions of a politically responsive domestic body, but "from a 
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation." 170 Nations are bound internationally by customary law 
through the consent they manifest in their statements or actions, including 
166. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886). 
167. A subspecies of the treaty is the rule made by an international body of 
which the nation is a member-the membership is likely to be a treaty obligation, but 
the specific principle or rule established by the body may or may not be binding upon 
the member nations. See TRIMBLE, supra note 107, at 121-22 (explaining that while the 
non-self-executing nature of a treaty may allow Congress to change the scope of treaty 
commitments and thus "effectively determine the scope of U.S. obligations under 
international laws," domestic and foreign political pressures can force compliance with 
such a principle or rule). 
168. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899). Justice Gray's statement 
came in a case that involved the legality of the capture of two fishing vessels, the Lola 
and the Paquete Habana, during the United States blockade of Cuba in the Spanish-
American War. The Court held the capture of the ship was illegal under international 
law. Id. at 713-14. However, the Navy had orders to abide by international law and, 
therefore, the Court's statement that international law is part of United States law was 
not critical to the decision. Further, The Paquete Habana was decided before Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 306 U.S. 64 (1938), and probably considered international 
law to be part of the general common law and not specifically federal common law. 
169. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
170. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (1987); see also TRIMBLE, supra note 107, at 177 ("Customary 
international law is defined as the practice states follow out of a sense of legal 
obligation."). 
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consent implied by their failure to announce their rejection of a well-
established norm. 171 The Executive, as the international representative of 
the United States, plays a major role in both defining and creating 
customary international law. 172 But the Executive's participation in 
creating, defining, and assenting to customary international law does not 
necessarily make customary law binding domestically in state or federal 
United States courts. 
Customary international law prevails over state law only if the 
Constitution or the constitutionally authorized federal government body 
incorporates it into federal law. There are a number of areas in which the 
Court has found that customary international law has been adopted in the 
United States, but there is great controversy over whether it should be 
considered enforceable without an express decision of a federal political 
body. 173 
1. Express Federal Incorporation of Customary International Law 
The Constitution specifically provides that Congress has power "[t]o 
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
171. Pronouncements by the Department of State are significant indications as 
to the views of the United States on whether particular practices are customary 
international law. Some of the common subjects of customary international law 
include the immunity of diplomats, the reach of national jurisdiction off the coast of a 
state, and the acknowledgment of the validity of acts by a state within a foreign state. 
See TRIMBLE, supra note 107, at 177-86 (discussing the operation of these subjects in 
the United States). Some subjects of customary law are also subjects of treaties-the 
treaties indicate both practice and international obligation, but bind only their 
signatories. Non-parties, however, may follow the practices specified in the treaty and 
do so because they believe that the conduct is required by international law. See 
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 679-80 (1986) (explaining that a rule of a treaty might become applicable to a 
non-party under customary international law because of that party's action or 
acquiescence in accordance with the general practice of party states-even though the 
non-party had no direct part in the rule-making). This may result in creating a 
customary rule binding on non-parties. 
172. See TRIMBLE, supra note 107, at 177-84; Michael P. Van Alstine, 
Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 318-
19 (2006) ("[T]he president possesses a near monopoly over the creation of sovereign 
obligations of the United States" and "serve[s] as the formal representative[ ] of the 
United States in international organizations."). 
173. Even its strongest proponent has expressed uncertainty over the basis for 
finding that customary international law is law of the United States. See LOUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 237-38. (2d ed. 1996). 
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Offenses against the Law of Nations." 174 This is the only express 
recognition of customary international law in the Constitution, and it 
empowers Congress to define and punish violations of customary 
international law. The power to punish offenses like piracies and felonies 
suggests a focus on the criminal responsibility of individuals rather than 
punishing violations by nations, which are abstract entities. 175 
Nevertheless, the language is broad enough to sustain legislative authority 
to define customary international law and assure obedience to it. As Chief 
Justice Waite said in connection with a federal law punishing the 
counterfeiting of foreign currency: 
A right secured by the law of nations to a nation, or its people, is one 
the United States as the representatives of this nation are bound to 
protect. Consequently, a law which is necessary and proper to afford 
this protection is one that Congress may enact, because it is one that is 
needed to carry into execution a power conferred by the Constitution 
on the Government of the United States exclusively.176 
Such statutes, when they confer rights on individual citizens of the 
United States, are privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 
a. Statutes and Treaties. Although the Constitution grants the 
power to define the law of nations to Congress, other federal entities also 
define or enforce it. Courts use customary international law to construe 
statutes and treaties. The source for the application of customary law is the 
act of Congress (statute) or President and Senate (treaty), but the basis for 
the decision is the court's presumption that the source of the law was 
derived in the context of international customs and norms that would 
naturally be included in the law's interpretation.177 
Some statutes specifically reference customary international law, and 
the Court must determine its substance in order to apply the statute. 178 
174. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 10. 
175. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 66-73 (photo. reprint 1979) (1769); see also G. Edward White, A Customary 
International Law of Torts, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 755, 763-69 (2006). 
176. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479,487 (1887). 
177. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
178. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000) ("Whoever, on the high seas, commits 
the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or 
found in the United States, shaH be imprisoned for life."); Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000) ("A foreign state shall not 
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The Court also interprets other statutes in the light of customary 
international law and uses customary international law to fill gaps in the 
statutory scheme. 179 Most importantly, the court uses customary 
international law to interpret ambiguous statutes. At the dawn of the 
nineteenth century, Chief Justice Marshall insisted in Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains .... " 180 
Customary international law may be used in treaty interpretation as 
well. 181 For example, Justice Miller used customary international law in 
United States v. Rauscher. 182 Although the treaty did not expressly forbid 
it, Miller construed an extradition treaty with Great Britain to prohibit 
proceeding against an extradited person on a charge that was not in the 
warrant of extradition. 183 As part of his analysis, Justice Miller cited 
writers on internationallaw. 184 Miller noted that "according to the doctrine 
of publicists and writers on international law, the country receiving the 
offender against its laws from another country had no right to proceed 
against him for any other offence than that for which he had been delivered 
up." 185 He then concluded that "this treaty did not intend to depart in this 
respect from the recognized public law which had prevailed in the absence 
of treaties .... " 186 
be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any 
case in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue ... 
. ");see also Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary 
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 919-
20 (2007) (discussing the federal piracy statute and FSIA). 
179. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 178, at 919-21. The authors 
refer to lower court decisions on the FSIA and to First Nat'! City Bank v. Banco Para el 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983), as examples of the use of 
customary international law as a gap filler in the interpretation of statutes. 
180. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("It 
has also been observed that an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and, consequently, can 
never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than 
is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country. These principles are 
believed to be correct .... "). 
181. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 178, at 921-22. 
182. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
183. !d. at419-20,424. 
184. /d. at 416-17 (citing law review articles and treatises). 
185. !d. at 419. 
186. !d. at 420. 
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b. Federal Common Law. Even when Congress has not enacted 
a substantive law, courts use customary international law to resolve issues 
within their jurisdiction-such as admiralty cases and disputes between 
states-where the federal courts are authorized to make federal common 
law. 187 After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, "there is no general federal 
common law,"188 but there are specific areas ancillary to the Constitution 
or federal statutes in which the federal courts must decide issues, and they 
may use customary international laws as norms for the rules they create. 
Another example of this federal common law is Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
in which the Court found that aliens could bring tort actions under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act189 for violations of customary internationallaw. 190 
The Court said the Alien Tort Act was intended merely as a 
jurisdictional grant and was not intended to create substantive causes of 
action. 191 However, the drafters understood that there were actions at 
common law for violation of international law in at least three instances: 
violation of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy.192 The Supreme Court held that this expectation of the Congress 
that drafted the statute was a "limited, implicit sanction"193 for the Court to 
find customary international law as a common law action in certain 
187. The judicial power of the United States in Article III, Section 2, extends 
to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" and to "Controversies between 
two or more States." U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. In resolving conflicts in these areas, the 
Court may turn to customary international law as a rule of decision. See Bradley, 
Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 178, at 915-19. 
188. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."). 
190. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Dr. Alvarez-Machain had 
been kidnapped in Mexico and brought to the United States to stand trial for allegedly 
abetting the torture of an American drug enforcement agent. ld. at 697-98. He was 
found not guilty and returned to Mexico. Id. at 698. He then filed suit in federal 
district court against Jose Francisco Sosa, a DEA agent involved in his kidnapping. Id. 
Alvarez-Machain also filed suit against the federal government under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act. ld. The Federal Tort Claims Act suit failed because the waiver of the 
sovereign immunity of the United States does not apply to any claim "arising in a 
foreign country." ld. at 699 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)). The Court decided that the 
tortious event occurred in Mexico, regardless of the fact that it was planned in 
California. !d. at 704. 
191. Id. at 713-14. 
192. Id. at 720. 
193. Id. at 712. 
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circumstances: "Accordingly, we think courts should require any claim 
based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized." 194 
Although the Court concluded that the claim of Alvarez-Machain did 
not satisfy this standard of a norm defined with specificity and accepted by 
the civilized world, the Court asserted its jurisdiction to apply customary 
international law as an inference from the action of Congress. 195 
The federal courts are not empowered to apply customary 
international law in every case, but only to use it as a source for the rules 
that they are otherwise empowered to create in the narrow areas of federal 
common law. States may also apply customary international law in cases 
when there is concurrent or even no federal jurisdiction. 
c. Executive Action. The Court has held that the President has 
power in foreign affairs as the chief executive of the nation. 196 In this 
respect, the President may deal with matters that are governed by 
international law in order to comply with its command as long as he is 
acting with the support of Congress or within his independent powers. For 
example, the behavior of the Executive in suggesting immunity for foreign 
heads of state arguably defines and enforces customary internationallaw. 197 
Diplomatic immunity may be connected to the President's power to receive 
ambassadors and other public ministers. 198 
Presidential agreements with foreign nations that are not treaties 
under the Constitution are still internationally binding. Where the 
agreement is within the power of the President in foreign relations, it binds 
states. 199 Such agreements may create enforceable rights in United States 
194. !d. at 725. 
195. See id. at 738. 
196. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 
(1936) (the Constitution vests in the president "plenary and exclusive power ... as the 
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations"). 
197. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 178, at 922-24; Harold 
Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1824, 1839-40 (1998) (discussing the interaction between customary international law, 
executive policy, the courts, and Congress in the area of sovereign immunity). 
198. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other 
public Ministers .... "). 
199. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (international 
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citizens and thus be a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States. 
When Congress legislates to implement the terms of an executive 
agreement, its legislation will likely be valid, and it erases any questions as 
to the validity of the agreement under executive power alone. 200 The line 
between treaties and the legitimate agreements of the executive has been a 
wavering one, little tested in the courts until recently.201 
However, the Medellin decision limited the President's role in 
defining and enforcing customary international law when Congress is 
silent, and the President lacks any relevant independent power granted by 
the Constitution.202 In Medellin, the United States government argued that 
even if the President had no power to enforce the ICJ decision on the 
Vienna Convention, the President could act to resolve an international 
dispute with Mexico by directing state courts to review the cases of the 
Mexican nationals involved in the ICJ decision. 203 The Supreme Court 
disagreed. When there is such a dramatic effect on the traditional 
compacts and treaties, like the assignment of claims concurrent with recognition of 
Soviet Union, have the same "dignity" as a treaty); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324, 326-27 (1937) (United States can sue on assignment of Soviet claims "effected by 
an exchange of diplomatic correspondence'· and contrary state policies must give way); 
see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) ("[V]alid executive 
agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are .... "). 
200. If the President acted constitutionally, implementation by Congress is 
"necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18. If 
the President exceeded constitutional authority, the implementing legislation would 
still likely be constitutional as an exercise of one of the powers expressly granted to 
Congress, such as the regulation of commerce with foreign nations or the power to tax 
and spend for the general welfare. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 8, cl. 13. If the agreement was 
a treaty ratified by the Senate, Congress may implement it even though it would 
otherwise be beyond congressional power. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 
(1920) (upholding a treaty and implementing a statute protecting migratory birds 
against state harms). 
201. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (holding the President 
lacked power to override a state law to settle an international dispute based on non-
self-executing aspects of a treaty); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) 
(upholding the suspension of claims against lran pursuant to an executive agreement 
with Iran); see also Van Alstine, supra note 172, at 345-48 (arguing that the power to 
create executive agreements should not equal a general presidential lawmaking power 
under a careful analysis of Garamendi). 
202. See Medell£n, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 ("The President's authority to act, as with 
the exercise of any governmental power, 'must stem from an act of Congress or from 
the Constitution itself."' (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668; Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952))). 
203. See id. at 1371. 
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operations of state government, the resolution of international problems 
must come from Congress. The Court said the precedents supporting 
presidential resolution of civil claims were not a sufficient basis to find 
congressional acquiescence for his intervention in state criminal 
processes. 204 "The President may comply with the treaty's obligations by 
some other means, so long as they are consistent with the Constitution."205 
In Medellin, the Court made it clear that the power of the President to 
make a legal rule that is binding domestically is limited, even if that rule is 
designed to facilitate international relations. The lawmaking power still 
resides primarily with Congress. zo6 
While Medellin seems to demand congressional authorization for the 
President to be able to make law domestically, it does not question the 
ability of the Executive to act in a manner that would bind the nation 
under international law. Even if such behavior does not create directly 
enforceable domestic law that would displace all conflicting state law, it 
establishes foreign policy that still may preclude state laws targeted at 
obstructing that policy. 207 For example, presidential foreign policy 
pronouncements may not override generally applicable state laws, but state 
laws that target specific foreign policies trespass on the nation's foreign 
relations power. 
2. The Dormant International Law Power 
While there is universal agreement that customary international law is 
federal law when the appropriate federal actor adopts it, there is 
controversy over its applicability as law when neither Congress nor the 
executive has acted to adopt it. Some believe that courts should not apply 
customary international law unless the political branches specifically 
authorize the court to do so. 208 Others argue that the political branches are 
204. See id. at 1371-72. 
205. Id. at 1371. 
206. See Van Alstine, supra note 172, for an excellent discussion of the limits 
on presidential power. 
207. See id. at 350 ("It may be correct to observe that, in its capacity as the 
external representative of the nation, the national executive may create foreign affairs 
norms of sufficient force to preclude affirmative state interference."). 
208. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law 
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 
817-20 (1997) (arguing that customary international law should not have the same 
status as federal common law, thus requiring authorization for the courts to apply it); 
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern 
and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 640-41 (2000) 
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bound by customary international law.209 The Sosa case touched off 
further debate on whether customary international law is federal common 
law. 210 Medellin seems to suggest that Congress must act specifically in 
order to make international law domestically binding unless there is a self-
executing treaty provision, but Medellin focused on presidential power and 
issues of remedy after breach. 211 It did not consider customary 
international law except in connection with an attempt to get around the 
non-self-executing nature of a treaty provision. 
This Article proposes a modified dormant Law of Nations Clause, 
analogizing the role of the court under the Law of Nations Clause to its 
role under the Commerce Clause. The issue arises at the point where the 
breach would occur-where a law that violates customary international law 
is applied-not at the remedial stage after breach has occurred. The federal 
obligation to protect citizens abroad provides the source for the inference 
that customary law should be obeyed in the absence of contrary intent. 
Where state law is not general but targeted at the conduct of foreign 
citizens or states in a manner that violates customary international law, it 
(arguing that customary international law does not influence national behavior-the 
faulty basis on which modern proponents of customary international law application 
premise their ideas-and thus courts should not be able to apply it without 
authorization); TRIMBLE, supra note 107, at 670-71 (arguing that customary 
international law is not equal to constitutional common law, and thus should only be 
applied by the political branches of our government and not the judiciary). 
209. See Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. 
J. lNT'L L. 377, 378 (1987) ("The President must obey and faithfully execute supreme 
federal law whether it is customary or treaty-based."). 
210. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations 
Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 169, 173 ("[I]nternational custom 
[is] part of enforceable federal law even in the absence of a statute."); Harold Hongju 
Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court 
Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 12 (2004) (arguing that 
customary international law must fit into federal common law because it is not state 
law, and if action by the political branches were required, it would have no status in 
United States law); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. 
Courts, 57 V AND. L. REV. 2241, 2259 (2004) ('"[I]nternational law is part of our law' 
and does not require further implementation by statute, treaty, or executive 
proclamation to be binding on domestic courts."). Contra Bradley, Goldsmith & 
Moore, supra note 178, at 902-06 (positing that Sosa involved congressional 
authorization of the application of customary international law, and thus the Court did 
not support its application without such authorization). 
211. See Medellin discussion supra Part III. C. 
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should be a violation of the dormant foreign affairs power.212 Just like 
executive foreign policy may mark off an area as beyond the proper 
functioning of the states, customary international law is a form of foreign 
policy supported at least inferentially by the federal government; thus, it 
preempts the operation of state governments in the field. 
Further, this Article suggests that courts should invalidate even 
generally applicable state laws to the extent they violate customary 
international law, but this supremacy of customary international law over 
state law is subject to at least three types of limitations: the same concerns 
that render treaties non-self-executing; the requirements of ascertainment 
and specificity imposed in Sosa to respond to the uncertainty of customary 
law and the sovereignty of the states; and any indication by the federal 
government that the specific customary international law will not be 
followed domestically. 
a. The Implication of a Constitutional Presumption. Even in the 
absence of a statute or express constitutional provision, the. Court has 
found states were precluded from acting by the implications from specific 
constitutional provisions. For example, the Court has implied limits on 
state action from the Constitution's affirmative grant of power to Congress 
in foreign commerce and from the President's power in foreign affairs, 
even when those branches were silent.213 The Court presumes that state 
discrimination against other states would run counter to the purpose of the 
grant of power unless Congress consents, and that some state regulations of 
foreign entities are incompatible with the President's power to deal with 
foreign nations. Similarly, the Court should find customary international 
law prevails over state laws if those laws conflict with the purpose of grants 
of power to other branches of the federal government. 
International law is a means for the protection of the person and 
property of citizens abroad; thus, compliance with international law assists 
in the performance of an obligation owed by the federal government to its 
citizens.214 Nations follow certain rules in order to encourage other nations 
to follow the same rules-cooperation may be in the self-interest of several 
nations, and establishing principles of customary international law is a 
method of signaling issues for cooperation.215 For example, unless a state 
212. See supra Part III.A.3. 
213. See supra Part liLA. 
214. See supra Part III.B. 
215. Critics challenge the existence of customary international law-arguing 
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protects the diplomats of other nations, its own diplomats will be at risk. 
The same is true of the property of other countries. It is not that violation 
of international law will bring forth a direct coercive sanction, but that it 
tends to reduce the ability of the violating state to persuade other nations 
to abide by customary international law when it undermines the rules 
themselves. States follow international law in order to gain certain 
benefits, and ignoring its terms deprives the nation of the potential gains 
from adherence. 
Therefore, the decision to breach international law should only be 
made for substantial reasons after considering the impact of the decision. 
Given the benefits from obedience to international law and the role of the 
nation in forming international law by its practice, it is appropriate to 
assume that the United States would choose to abide by international law 
as a normal matter. Further, customary law is built by state practice 
undertaken with the state's understanding that it is legally obligated to so 
act. Since customary international law is based on state behavior, it would 
be anomalous to assume that the United States would not engage in the 
same behavior as the vast majority of nations. Courts should make that 
same assumption-and, in fact, they often do so when construction of 
treaties and statutes is at issue. 216 One source for this presumption is 
Article I of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to assure 
the enforcement of the law of nations. 217 That suggests that the power to 
breach international law should be a decision for the federal government, 
and that courts should presume that the national government obeys 
international law unless it indicates otherwise. The application of that 
presumption when the political branches are silent on an issue would 
invalidate state laws that violate customary international law. For these 
reasons, the Court was correct in The Paquete Habana to state that 
customary international law is part of United States law unless the 
President or Congress indicates otherwise.218 
At the very least, just as the Court upholds general state regulations 
that nation-states simply do not act out of obligation but always pursue their self-
interest and, therefore, one of the elements of customary international law is non-
existent. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 208, at 654-66. Reciprocal behavior 
pursuant to a norm, however, should be a sufficient basis to find that customary 
international law exists and is a workable entity. 
216. See supra Part III.D.l.a. 
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("To define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations."). 
218. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899). 
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under the Commerce Clause but strikes down those discriminatory against 
interstate or foreign commerce, the Court should strike down state laws 
that are directed at creating a violation of customary international law. For 
example, state legislation concerning illegal aliens is targeted at an 
international issue. Whatever the general validity of such laws, the state 
should not be able to act in such a way as to violate customary 
international law unless the federal government authorizes it. 
b. Limitations on the Application of Customary International Law. 
The state law targeted at creating a violation of customary international 
law presents the strongest case for invalidity under federal foreign affairs 
powers. It is analogous to the exercise of foreign policy by the President, 
which does not create a domestic law but supports a finding that state 
attempts to oppose that policy impermissibly intrude on a federal function. 
The rationale for invalidating state violations of customary 
international law could be extended to generally applicable laws as well by 
analogy to the dormant Commerce Clause. The focus is not on the actions 
of the executive but the presumed will of Congress. However, such a 
presumptive application of customary international law would only 
override state law in very limited circumstances. 
All the bases for refusing to apply treaty provisions can have their 
counterparts with respect to customary law: 1) sovereign immunity may 
block suits by individuals against governments; 2) customary law may not 
be self-executing but may require domestic agencies to first take action, 
such as when customary international law makes behavior criminal or 
requires expenditures; 3) customary international law may be too vague for 
enforcement or may be merely hortatory; and 4) customary law may be on 
a subject matter that is for the benefit of nations only, and citizens may lack 
standing to raise it. 219 If the customary law would not be enforceable as a 
treaty provision, it should not be enforceable when it has even less 
demonstrated support from political branches.220 As in Medellin, 
customary international law is not a viable means for evading the non-self-
219. See supra notes 124-141 and accompanying text. 
220. Treaties may prevail over previously enacted federal statutes because the 
political process has followed the lawmaking procedure specified in the Constitution; 
customary international law does not have that virtue. It is a practice, and practices in 
conflict with statutes are violations of the law, not new law creations. Consequently, 
customary law does not override existing federal statutes, even if the custom was 
created after the statute was enacted. 
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executing nature of a treaty provision. 221 
In addition, the difficulty of ascertaining the content of customary 
international law, as well as respect for the sovereignty of the states, 
cautions against application of customary international law to override 
general state law provisions unless it is very clear and specific in the 
particular case.222 Because customary law derives from practice, its content 
is far more debatable than that of treaties. Different characterizations of 
that practice produce different principles, and the extent to which the 
practice is sufficiently accepted to become law will often be uncertain. 
The Paquete Habana is an example both of the methodology used by 
courts to determine customary international law and the difficulty of the 
process. The Court ran through a history of state practices with regard to 
fishing boats during wartime, including agreements between belligerents 
and pronouncements by nations, and cited the views of a number of 
international law treatises before concluding that such boats cannot be 
taken. 223 Nevertheless, three judges dissented over whether such a rule 
existed, or was merely behavior that was sometimes followed and was 
sometimes not. 224 When the political branches do not pass on the content 
of customary international law, courts must look to other sources as they 
did in The Paquete Habana. These other sources include international 
agreements, the behavior of other nations, scholars' conclusions about state 
practice, and the behavior of the United States in general. There is general 
agreement on how customary international law is created, but no rule 
about how many nations must engage in a practice before it becomes 
binding on other nations, or what evidence demonstrates that the practice 
was done from a sense of legal obligation. While scholars may point to 
conventions and statements from political leaders as evidence of state 
practice, states often depart from the principles to which they pay lip 
service. Since customary international law is based on practice, courts 
should be looking to behavior at least as much as statements by nations. If 
the courts focus on the purpose of applying this law-keeping faith with 
the likely will of the political branches that control the foreign relations of 
the United States-they will understand that the practice of states counts 
more in binding governments than the pious hopes expressed. That is 
221. See supra Part III. C. 
222. See Trimble, supra note 171, at 713-15 (cautioning against application of 
customary law without affirmative support from the executive or the legislature 
because of the difficulty of ascertainment of proper foreign legal policy). 
223. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686-714. 
224. Id. at 715-21 (Fuller, J., dissenting). 
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particularly true when the United States has agreed to a declaration of 
principles but refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the body designed to 
decide issues under it. 
The difficulty of determining whether a particular practice is 
customary international law does not excuse the failure to even attempt to 
ascertain it. In Sosa, the Court acknowledged both the difficulty and the 
ability of courts to apply customary international law. 225 Decisions of 
international bodies, such as the ICJ, and United Nations resolutions are 
entitled to deference in determining the content of customary international 
law, but the application of customary international law in the United States 
is implemented by domestic courts, who determine the content of that law 
for themselves. The Supreme Court has already refused to accept a 
decision of the ICJ as decisive on treaty interpretation, and therefore it 
would not be likely to accept international bodies' decisions as 
determinative of customary international law. 226 When the contours or 
force of a customary law principle are in doubt, it cannot be assumed that 
the federal government wishes to abide by it. In this sense, customary 
international law may be optional until it has passed an ill-defined 
threshold of both specificity and acceptance in practice. Both state and 
federal courts may apply customary international law in various situations 
where such law is in the stages of developing or is unclear. Even its 
application in that situation may be useful for interpretation of statutes or 
treaties or to resolve other issues within the court's jurisdiction; however, 
customary international law should not be used to invalidate state acts 
unless it is clearly established. 
Once it passes that threshold, however, it should be considered 
mandatory on the states. Where neither Congress nor the Executive has 
taken a position on the content of customary international law, courts 
should only invalidate state behavior that violates clearly established 
customary law. When it does, a state's violation of international law should 
be held to be an interference with federal supremacy in foreign affairs. 227 
At the least, it should be a violation of federal supremacy for the state to 
act in a manner that is targeted at the customary international law rule. 228 
225. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-31 (2004). 
226. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) ("Nothing in 
the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be 
conclusive on our courts."). 
227. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). 
228. See supra Part III.A.3. Thus, even if courts uphold generally applicable 
state laws that incidentally violate customary international law, state laws targeted at 
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The application of customary international law in United States 
courts may nullify state statutes or state executive actions. Such an 
impingement on state sovereignty runs contrary to the "new federalism," 
which stresses the sovereignty of the states.229 When the political branches 
of the federal government breach international law, it is seen, domestically, 
as a legitimate exercise of the political process. Hence, respect for state 
political choices should at least cause a court to pause before striking them 
down as violations of customary international law. 230 A party seeking to 
avail itself of customary international law should bear the burden of 
proving the existence of the practice. It is not enough that a customary 
norm is emerging-it must be established customary law before it is 
appropriate to use it to strike down state law. Nevertheless, courts should 
not breach customary international law by giving legal effect to laws that 
violate it. State behavior should not prevail when it will promote 
disharmony that would defeat the purpose of the grants of foreign affairs 
power to the federal government. The tests established in Sosa for 
applying customary law should suffice for its application as a defense to 
state laws.231 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
states that customary international law is part of United States law. 232 Yet, 
foreign relations that violate customary international law should be invalid. 
229. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 208, at 867-70 (arguing that 
displacement of state sovereignty is a basis for rejecting customary international law). 
230. This concern influenced the analogous decision in Medellin, in which the 
Court found the President lacked power to override state criminal law to settle the 
dispute with Mexico over the treatment of accused Mexican nationals. See Medellin v. 
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371-72 (2008). The Court acknowledged the President has the 
authority to comply with an international treaty obligation outside of a non-self-
executing treaty-as long as the treaty is consistent with the Constitution-and that 
the President has indeed utilized "executive agreements to settle civil claims between 
American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals." ld. at 1371. 
However, the Court distinguished these cases from the Presidential Memorandum at 
issue in Medellin when it stated: 
[T]he Government has not identified a single instance in which the President 
has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued 
to state courts, much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State's 
police powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and 
set aside neutrally applicable state laws. 
Id. at 1372. 
231. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
232. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 111-15 (1987); see also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the 
HeinOnline -- 56 Drake L. Rev.  1102 2007-20082
1102 Drake Law Review [Vol. 56 
opposing scholars cite Justice Miller's decision in Ker v. Illinois as support 
for their argument that states do not have to follow customary 
international law unless Congress or the President have acted to make it 
part of federal law. 233 However, Ker may instead illustrate the quite 
different principle that states are not bound domestically by customary 
international law rules if the federal government itself violates them. 234 
For purposes of determining whether United States citizens have 
privileges or immunities in customary international law within the United 
States, it is critical to determine whether the federal government is 
following or disregarding such law. In The Paquete Habana, Justice Gray 
wrote, "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative 
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of 
civilized nations .... "235 The comment implies that customary law does 
not bind the legislature or the executive domestically, although it may 
apply when they do not act. If the federal government chooses to disregard 
customary international law, it may do so-just as statutes enacted by 
Congress supersede treaties. Nations are bound by customary 
international law through their acquiescence in practice. If the federal 
government acts contrary to customary international law, it has indicated 
its unwillingness to be bound domestically; therefore, states should also not 
be bound by that provision of customary law. Some scholars argue that the 
President is bound to enforce customary international law because he is to 
enforce the law, and the customary international law is federal common 
law; however, if the basis for application of customary international law is a 
presumption of intent in the foreign relations area, the chief officer with 
respect to foreign affairs acts with discretion in determining what policy 
should be, and he is not bound domestically. 236 
Ker may serve to highlight the principle that states are not bound 
domestically by customary international law rules if the federal 
government itself violates them. In Ker, the original alleged violation of 
United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (1984) ("International law became part of 
'our law' with independence in 1776. "). 
233. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 178, at 884 & n.74 (citing 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1889), as a "pre-Erie decision suggesting that CIL 
[customary international law] was not federal law"). 
234. See infra notes 237-45. 
235. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899). 
236. See generally Editorial Comment, Agora: May the President Violate 
Customary International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986); Agora: May the President 
Violate Customary International Law? (Cont'd), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371 (1987). 
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customary international law was performed by an agent of the federal 
government. 237 A federal agent seized Frederick Ker in Peru, took him 
back to the United States forcibly, and turned him over to state authorities 
for trial.238 After his conviction in state court, he filed a writ of error to the 
Supreme Court claiming violation of the extradition treaty with Peru and 
denial of due process of law. 239 The Court found the circumstances of his 
seizure did not invalidate the trial, nor was the trial a denial of due process 
of law.240 It also found the seizure was not undertaken pursuant to the 
treaty, and therefore the subsequent trial itself was not a treaty violation. 241 
Miller then said that the Court would not decide how far the circumstances 
of Ker's seizure could be used as a defense in state trial, "for in that 
transaction we do not see that the Constitution, or laws, or treaties of the 
United States guaranty him any protection."242 But Miller added that: 
[The issue of whether forcible seizure is a defense to the trial] is as 
much within the province of the State court, as a question of common 
law, or of the law of nations, of which that court is bound to take 
notice, as it is of the courts of the United States. And though we might 
or might not differ with the Illinois court on that subject, it is one in 
which we have no right to review their decision. 243 
Miller went on to note his expectation that the agent who seized Ker 
would be subject to punishment under Peruvian law and would be liable in 
a state action for tort. 244 His statement that the law of nations is within the 
province of the state court, scholars argue, shows that Miller and the Court 
understood that "the law of nations" was an issue of general law and not of 
federal law.245 Miller's conclusion that the Supreme Court could not 
review the decision of the Illinois court on the law of nations supports that 
237. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438-39. 
238. /d. 
239. /d. at 439-40. 
240. /d. at 440. 
241. /d. at 441-43. In United States v. Rauscher, Miller's opinion for the Court 
held that a defendant in federal court who was brought to court from Great Britain 
pursuant to an extradition treaty with that nation could preclude his trial for any 
offense other than the ones for which he was delivered pursuant to the treaty. United 
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886). 
242. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444. 
243. /d. 
244. /d. 
245. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. 
Courts-Before and After Erie, 26 DENY. J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 807, 813-16 (1998). 
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position, although he also said the state court was "bound to take notice" 
of the law of nations. 246 Miller's statements were dicta because Ker did not 
argue customary international law, but they may also be explained as 
specific to the case. 
In Ker, the abduction was executed by an agent of the federal 
government and, thus, the federal government was complicit in the 
violation, if any violation indeed occurred. Consequently, the state was not 
bound by domestic law to follow customary international law, but it was 
free to do so in its own jurisdiction. After all, the state may choose to 
avoid breaching customary international law even when it may do so as a 
matter of domestic law. To the extent that customary international law is 
not binding on the states, a state's application makes it state law rather 
than federal law. Ker indicated that customary international law to some 
extent does not bind the state, but the decision left open whether states 
could in some circumstances be bound by it.247 
When the federal government acts entirely consistently with 
customary international law, but without enacting a law or acting in other 
ways to enforce it against the states, international law should be presumed 
to be the foreign policy of the United States. The political branches have 
the power to reject international law domestically. Therefore, they are 
ultimately responsible for the application of customary international law, 
even if they are silent and the courts take silence as assent. 248 In this 
246. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444. 
247. The Supreme Court relied on Ker more than a century later when it held 
that Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain could be tried in federal district court after being 
kidnapped in Mexico and brought to the United States. United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657, 660-62 (1992). Alvarez-Machain was charged with 
assisting in the torture of an American drug enforcement agent in Mexico. /d. at 657. 
Dr. Alvarez-Machain alleged that the U.S. government was involved in the decision to 
abduct him, and Mexico protested the abduction. See id. at 658, 669. The Court held 
that the extradition treaty with Mexico did not prohibit the abduction or the trial. /d. 
at 669-70. It concluded that even if the abduction violated general international law 
principles, the trial could still take place. /d. While the court was not entirely clear, it 
may have considered the executive to have the power to override customary 
international law. The kidnapping, after all, was part of the executive's attempt to 
enforce the laws. 
248. Critics contend that courts should deny authority to customary 
international law because it is created internationally by bodies and individuals not 
responsible to the domestic political process of the United States. See Bradley & 
Goldsmith, supra note 208, at 838-42 (discussing the development of customary 
international law and its progression away from the state practice requirement). But 
political power remains with the domestic political process if customary international 
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respect, the inference from the Law of Nations Clause is not significantly 
different from that of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. 
Acknowledgement of customary international law as a restriction on 
state-but not federal-power when the federal political branches are 
silent is an act of deference to the federal political branches that 
simultaneously secures the place of the nation among the family of nations. 
Because federal violations of customary international law indicate an 
unwillingness for that principle to bind the United States, any domestic 
court finding that a state is bound under customary international law 
requires two steps-determining the content of the customary international 
law, and determining that the United States federal government has acted 
consistently with that norm and has not indicated it would reject it. 
E. Customary International Human Rights Law 
Customary international law has traditionally been about the 
behavior of nations toward other nations. Nations engage in an 
international practice in order to encourage other nations to engage in the 
same practice and thus create reciprocal benefits. Treatment by a nation of 
its own citizens has historically been of less import to international law. 
Thus, the notion that federal power to represent the nation in international 
affairs would have consequences with respect to the treatment of citizens 
by their own states was not well recognized. Congress was expected to 
define international law in relation to international affairs, and there was 
no thought that the power might extend to domestic matters. But 
international law has developed in a new direction since World War II. 
The establishment of the United Nations and its organs and, more 
profoundly, the promulgation of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights249 mark a new turn toward the development of an 
international human rights law.2so 
If the domestic effect of customary international law is limited to 
establishing a presumed foreign policy for purposes of determining when 
the state has targeted an inappropriate foreign affairs area, it would not 
apply to the treatment of a state's own citizens. Even if the dormant 
law is just the default position when the federal political branches of government have 
neither indicated that customary international law should be followed, nor suggested 
that it should not. 
249. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
250. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 208, at 831-32. 
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foreign affairs power is given the full effect contended in the previous Part, 
the United States has been careful to stipulate that its agreement to human 
rights documents will not carry internal effect, and that is sufficient to 
preclude application of the dormant Law of Nations Clause.251 Further, 
even if customary international human rights did apply directly, it would 
have no effect. The application of customary international human rights 
laws to the states under the strict standards suggested here would have no 
current effect. 252 Every listed right would be a violation of the Bill of 
251. Even if customary international law is part of United States law, there are 
reasons to be more wary of customary international human rights law. The 
presumption of international law applicability was justified as a measure to secure 
reciprocal obedience by other nations that would ultimately benefit the United States 
and its citizens in their dealings abroad. Unfortunately, getting other nations to treat 
their own citizens well does not have such apparent benefits for the United States. 
Further, while the Constitution says very little about international relations, it has a 
great many provisions regarding human rights. Thus, it is arguable that it should be the 
exclusive source for domestic law on the limits that human rights concerns impose on 
government. The meaning of human rights may be very different in the United States 
than in other countries. To the extent that international law scholars and courts are 
claiming customary international law based on the declarations of international bodies 
like the United Nations, rather than the actual practices of nations, they undercut at 
least one of the reasons for assuming the United States would comply with its terms. 
Further, the United States has been very reluctant to join political and civil rights 
compacts unless they are purely hortatory and create no binding obligation. Scholars 
have argued that the refusal to be bound internationally by agreements with respect to 
the way in which the United States treats its own citizens precludes the application of 
customary international human rights norms in United States courts. See Bradley & 
Goldsmith, supra note 208, at 869-70 (explaining the tactic of the United States 
government of attaching RODs-reservations, understandings, and declarations-to 
ratifications of treaties so as not to disrupt current domestic law). 
252. With respect to the content of customary international human rights law, 
there are a number of emerging principles but very few established principles sufficient 
to base a limit upon the action of states. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States lists as established human rights principles the renunciation of 
"genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, 
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged 
arbitrary detention, systemic racial discrimination, or a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights." 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 702(a)-(g) (1987). The Court in 
Sosa demanded more: 
Even the Restatement's limits are only the beginning of the enquiry, because 
although it is easy to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions 
are so bad that those who enforce them become enemies of the human race, it 
may be harder to say which policies cross that line with the certainty afforded 
by Blackstone's three common law offenses. 
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Rights of our Constitution. Any state's behavior that violates customary 
international human rights law also violates the Constitution independently 
of any international norm. There is no reason to inquire into customary 
law because it is not decisive on the issue. 
Nevertheless, customary international human rights may become law 
of the United States in at least two ways. It may influence the 
interpretation of United States constitutional provisions, and it may still 
provide a basis for Congress to legislate to enforce customary human rights 
law as the law of nations. 
Customary international human rights may influence the 
interpretation of United States constitutional provisions. It is unlikely that 
the Court will find state practices satisfy due process of law when they vary 
from federal practices and are inconsistent with established customary 
international human rights. For example, many nations have repudiated 
the death penalty and some writers have argued that it, or some 
manifestations of it, violates customary international human rights law.253 
Nevertheless, it has not achieved the acceptance in practice and specificity 
to meet the high standard of Sosa. Of course, the application of the death 
penalty under federal law is a clear indication that the United States does 
not consider the abolition binding. So far, the Court has resisted all 
attempts at blanket abolition, but it seems reasonable that it would shift 
this position were the federal government to abolish the death penalty for 
federal crimes, and the international community were to make it a clear 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004). Besides torture, genocide-as 
defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 ("acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group")-is surely such a 
violation, but few other acts will meet the demanding standard raised in Sosa. 
253. See Michelle McKee, Note, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: 
Understanding Why the United States' Use of the Death Penalty Violates Customary 
International Law, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 153, 154 (2000) ("[T]he abolition of the 
death penalty has evolved into customary international law and ... the United States 
has continued to exercise the death penalty in a manner that violates customary 
international law and international agreements."). The South African Constitutional 
Court reviewed comparative law in holding that the then-interim constitution 
prohibited capital punishment. State v. Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 
at para. 33 (S. Afr.) ("Today capital punishment has been abolished as a penalty for 
murder either specifically or in practice by almost half the countries of the world 
including the democracies of Europe and our neighboring countries, Namibia, 
Mozambique and Angola."). For further examples of cases in the United States court 
system see Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 
DUKE L.J. 485, 490 n.14 (2002). 
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violation of customary international human rights. At that point, the 
direction internally, as well as internationally, would point against the 
death penalty, and the Court would be very likely to find the penalty 
violates due process; thus avoiding any direct application of customary 
international human rights law but also avoiding any conflict with it. This 
seems to be what happened in Roper v. Simmons, which held the juvenile 
death penalty unconstitutional.254 For the purposes of interpreting 
domestic provisions of the Constitution in cases when customary 
international law is only one factor in the decision, the Court will be much 
more liberal in its understanding of that law.255 
Congress, of course, has power to define violations of customary 
international law, and it has done so for certain purposes in the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991.256 But torture would seem to violate several 
provisions of the United States Constitution apart from the statute.257 
There are only a small number of areas in which developing customary 
international human rights might differ from rights that the Court could 
find under the Bill of Rights. Some of those areas include: procedural 
blocks to vindication of human rights, indigenous rights, and finally, 
affirmative rights. These are unlikely to be found under the United States 
Constitution, but they could become customary international human rights 
law-enforceable through Congressional action. 
One area in which customary international human rights law may 
develop is when there have been procedural blocks to basic human rights. 
A number of international bodies have found the United States in violation 
254. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,575 (2005). 
255. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 178, at 934-35. 
256. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 
(1992) (codified at28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)). Section 3(b)(1) states: 
/d. 
[T]he term "torture" means any act, directed against an individual in the 
offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other 
than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that 
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual 
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind .... 
257. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process); id. at amend. VIII ("nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"). 
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of international law despite decisions by the United States courts that the 
victims were precluded by procedural bars from contesting the substantive 
issue. One example is provided by the consular access cases like Medellin 
and Sanchez-Llamas that have already been discussed. In Mary and Carrie 
Dann v. United States, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
determined that the proceedings by which the United States contended 
that Western Shoshone rights in their ancestral lands had been 
extinguished were improper. 258 The Commission found the United States 
had failed to apply the same just-compensation standard for the taking of 
lands as applied to others, and was in violation of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 259 The decision had no 
domestic legal effect, but it indicates that international bodies may apply a 
different view of procedural requirements when basic human rights are at 
stake. While the precedents in Dann, Medellin, and Sanchez-Llamas reject 
international views of procedural defaults, repeated developments in 
customary international human rights decisions and national behavior may 
ultimately bring about a different view. 
There are a whole series of claims that indigenous peoples make that 
are not yet customary international human rights law, but this too may 
change. Many are at the very early stage of a draft report of a United 
Nations subcommittee-far from acceptance as established customary 
international law. Nevertheless, the norms have developed sufficiently to 
receive some recognition in international forums and may eventually 
develop into a sufficiently specific and well-accepted norm as to constitute 
the kind of customary law that would meet the standard expressed in 
Sosa. 260 While these norms would have only peripheral impact in the 
United States-because most law relating to Native Americans is federal 
law rather than state law-the rules would be unlikely to be incorporated 
as due process under the Bill of Rights because they are unique to a 
specific group of people, and the application of the individual rights 
guarantees of the Constitution have been universal. Thus, to the limited 
extent that states violate the norms, the application of customary 
international human rights law to the state would reach beyond express 
constitutional guarantees. Congress would thus have multiple bases for 
258. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, 
OEA/Ser.LN/11.117, doc. 1 rev. 'tl'tl 1-5 (2002) (merits decision), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/usa.11140.htm. 
259. I d. at 'tl'tl170-72. 
260. SeeS. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61-
73 (2d ed. 2004). 
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acting. 
A third area in which developing international human rights law 
would not be likely to fit existing constitutional provisions is in the creation 
of affirmative socioeconomic rights. The guarantees in the United States 
Constitution have been negative in character-prohibitions on state action 
and the restrictions of the Bill of Rights. 261 The late twentieth century has 
seen the development of affirmative guarantees in national constitutions-
requiring states to provide specific things for their citizens, such as 
education and healthcare. 262 In some instances, national courts, such as the 
Supreme Court in South Africa, have enforced such affirmative guarantees 
despite the difficulty and delicacy of doing so.263 Affirmative rights will not 
become customary international human rights in the near future with the 
specificity and support in state practice required to satisfy the suggested 
standard. Nevertheless, affirmative rights may become almost universal in 
international resolutions and state practice in the more distant future. In 
that distant day, a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States 
may be to secure such affirmative rights from his state. 
261. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 644 (1966) (prohibiting 
enforcement of New York election law "requiring an ability to read and write English 
as a condition for voting"). 
262. See generally VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TuSHNET, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1661-1766 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing judicial enforcement of 
social welfare rights in Japan, South Africa, and Hungary); Mark S. Kende, The South 
African Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 137 (2003) (exploring the South African Constitution and 
South Africa's enforcement of socioeconomic rights and critically examining American 
constitutional jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights in light of South African 
decisions); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (recognizing the "right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health"); id. at art. 
13 (recognizing the "right of everyone to education"). 
263. See Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others 
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that the government is constitutionally 
obligated to plan and implement an effective and comprehensive program for the 
prevention of mother-child HIV transmission); Government of the Republic of South 
Africa & Others v. Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that 
the state must take reasonable measures to provide access to adequate housing in order 
to uphold the constitutional obligation to housing); see also Mark S. Kende, The South 
African Constitutional Court's Construction of Socio-Economic Rights: A Response to 
Critics, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 617, 617 (2004) ("The [South African] Constitutional 
Court ... has done exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court has said courts cannot and 
should not do-enforce socio-economic rights."). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States as 
envisioned by Justice Miller have a significant international component. 
The federal government is responsible for the preservation of the life, 
liberty, and property of its citizens abroad; protecting them from attack by 
foreign nations; and facilitating their commerce. One of the major means 
to accomplish this is through support of the international order-treaties 
and international institutions. The means for providing such privileges or 
immunities is in the discretion of the political branches of government. 
The concentration of power in the federal government, however, creates 
limits on state power to interfere with its citizens in the international arena. 
Thus, as Miller recognized, the dormant foreign Commerce Clause limits 
state regulations of foreign commerce, and the federal obligation to protect 
citizens also limits the states' role, given that treaties are enforceable in 
state courts by individuals. By taking the perspective of the fundamental 
rights of citizens, this Article concludes that: local government cannot 
boycott the goods and services of its citizens because they dealt with a 
boycotted nation; the right to travel internationally should be protected to 
a greater degree than other non-fundamental liberties; and treaties should 
be presumed to be self-executing. 
The desirability of supporting international law as a means for 
securing the benefits for U.S. citizens suggests that support of customary 
international law, as well as treaty provisions, should be considered a 
privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States. Like the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the power to define offenses against the law of nations 
should give rise to a presumption that clear violations of specific customary 
international human rights laws conflict with the federal foreign affairs 
power and denies a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States. 
This conclusion should not have any significant effect on outcomes in cases 
in the near term because all such violations would be violations of specific 
prohibitions in the Constitution as well; however, the principle may be a 
useful one to develop the protection of human rights for future 
generations. 
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PROFESSOR REBECCA ZIETLOW: If that is all the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause means, then what is the point of the Fourteenth 
Amendment? We had just fought a bloody Civil War where half a million 
people died, brothers killing brothers over the issue of whether the feds 
could protect individual rights when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
added to the Constitution. 
PROFESSOR DAVID BOGEN: Two answers: One, I would not 
stand up here if the Court had not completely perverted the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses to accomplish what it has. The response with 
respect to those other clauses is to do what was envisioned in large 
measure. The second thing is, I think if the Clause did not exist, there 
would still be these questions of what rights does the citizen have 
internationally with respect to foreign relations. This is eventually going to 
empower Congress, but it will take a heck of a long time because the 
empowerment would be through customary international law with respect 
to human rights. The way human rights will become part of American law 
is the degree to which the Court interprets existing process, like the Due 
Process law, to reflect understandings that have occurred internationally. I 
do not think that you have a solid customary international law, for 
example, against the death penalty. It is wrong, and my conviction is that 
change would occur if it reached the point where we could say that all 
civilized nations agree, except for one of the civilized nations, that if it 
becomes so widespread that it is repudiated at the level of the federal 
government-that is, the federal government has stopped the death 
penalty through federal legislation. The Court is going to step in and say, 
"Well, if the feds don't do it and the world does not do it, it cannot be 
constitutional." When something becomes an international human right by 
large measure, a lot of them will simply be folded in as "that is what our 
Constitution says." But, to the extent that this is something that Congress 
has the power to define-and it does have the power to define offences 
against the law of nations-the law of nations did not include individual 
human rights when the Constitution was adopted, because we did not make 
treaties about that, but we do now. If you do now, and if we give what 
Mike talked about earlier in terms of, okay that was then, how does the 
principle grow? Well, the principle is growing in terms of what 
international communities are concerned with, so I would find that 
1113 
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Congress has the power to implement international human rights through 
legislation. 
PROFESSOR RANDY BARNETI: I suppose I have a 
methodological question that stems from what the originalists were asking 
before-why should we care about Framers' intent-and I said basically we 
should not. I guess what I want to know is, by what criteria do we decide if 
your interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is correct? You got up 
and you summarized what you think the Fourteenth Amendment means. 
By means of Miller, you mean Miller's argument in terms of the Slaughter-
House Cases are correct interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
How do we know? How do we decide? We all have open minds here, we 
are willing to be persuaded that you are right about the Fourteenth 
Amendment and about the Slaughter-House Cases, but what is the criteria 
of truthfulness here? What are the criteria of rightness? Do we just like 
the results that your interpretation yields? Instead of why we care about 
Framers' intent, why do we care about your intent with respect to the 
Fourteenth Amendment? 
PROFESSOR DAVID BOGEN: No reason you should, but I have 
two points. One is a slight mischaracterization in that I agree with Michael 
in terms of what the Framers and those people who were drafting the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause designed it to do. I just think the Court 
has accomplished that in other means and that they are unlikely to change 
clauses-! do not think it is going to happen. Given that, I want to take a 
look at what the Court has said exists out there and at least get people 
thinking. I'm taking a first crack at this. Everybody else has been up here 
and they know what they're talking about; let me assure you, I do not! I'm 
coming up with some ideas that I will be elaborating on in terms of what 
are our rights internationally. But what I am trying to do is say, "Hey guys, 
we have not been thinking about this." We have yet to take the 
perspective on international issues that the document was designed-the 
government was designed-for the establishment of protection of citizens 
of the United States vis-a-vis for the outside world. One little example of 
where I think that stance takes me-and I think it is more of an 
interpretive stance than a substantive one-can a city or locality boycott a 
foreign country like Sudan or South Africa, where there is not a law that 
prohibits you from doing it, but it simply says that we are not going to buy 
or sell goods to the country we think is bad? I'm not even expressing an 
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opinion on that, but it seems to me that if a state or municipality does that, 
it cannot say that we will boycott anybody who deals with [that country], 
because fundamentally the relationship between the individual and the 
United States has been that the individual's access to foreign trade was one 
of those rights. If you take that stance, then you are going to interpret the 
Commerce Clause or the foreign affairs power to prohibit. 
PROFESSOR DANIEL FARBER: Two things. Let me try to 
restate part of your thesis to make sure I am getting it. It seems to me that 
your interpretation of Miller-! agree we are not talking about the Framers 
of the Amendment-is that there are inchoate national interests that 
Congress would legislate to protect, like the rights to engage in interstate 
commerce, and that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects those 
interests against state interference even when Congress has not legislated. 
That is the first part. The second part is a specific example. Do you view 
the Clause as creating a right of international travel? 
PROFESSOR DAVID BOGEN: As for the second part of your 
question, no. The clause, in Miller's view, creates nothing. But that does 
not mean that the right is not there. I would argue that yes, there is a right 
to international travel derived from the relationship of the citizen vis-a-vis 
to the nation. (Professor Daniel Farber: I would rephrase my question to 
ask in those terms.) I think that we have had really fundamental rights of 
freedom of speech. If you are in the military, it is going to be limited, but I 
think all of the case law with respect to the right to international travel that 
has approved limits on international travel has been, "Gee, we have to 
show terrific deference to foreign policy." Because of that you can have 
geographical restrictions that can prevent people from going over to cause 
these troubles. But there is also a line of cases which have found, well, 
really the reason why you are preventing these people from going abroad 
has not much to do with foreign affairs or foreign policy, but these guys are 
Communists. We are going to take a look at that and say you cannot 
restrict for that reason so that you will get procedural protection. 
Combined with that is that states cannot restrict your international travel. 
I think everybody would acknowledge that, but I would say that there is a 
strong right when you account for all the rights of liberty and that all the 
liberties are protected equally. I think that this is particularly protected, 
but foreign policy trumps. 
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PROFESSOR MAURA STRASSBERG: In making lemonade out 
of this lemon, I was wondering if you could view this as possibly expanding 
on the Full Faith and Credit provision, so that gay marriage in 
Massachusetts would have to be recognized in other states as a citizenship 
right? In other words, extending from this notion that, as a citizen, you 
have a right to travel, and that in travelling, you ought not to be deprived 
of your rights as you travel. I am just curious whether that has potential. 
PROFESSOR DAVID BOGEN: An article has been written 
making these suggestions. My proposition on Privileges or Immunities 
does not necessarily go that far or not go that far. That is partly because I 
just said that there is something no one has been talking about, which was 
international, so let me take a look at that and see what it is. Now you are 
talking about interstate travel, where the focus of scholarship has 
historically been the movement of individuals from State A to State B, and 
what restrictions, rights, and differentials can be made to prevent them 
from moving. I do not have an answer off the top of my head, but yes, it is 
possible to say that this is all part of our consideration of what it means to 
be a national citizen. 
